The Contributions Of United Nations Security Council Resolutions To The Law Of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence Of Customary International Law by Fox, Gregory H. et al.
American University Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 1
2018
The Contributions Of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions To The Law Of Non-
International Armed Conflict: New Evidence Of
Customary International Law
Gregory H. Fox
Wayne State University Law School, gfox@wayne.edu
Kristen E. Boon
Seton Hall University Law School, kristen.boon@shu.edu
Isaac Jenkins
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fox, Gregory H.; Boon, Kristen E.; and Jenkins, Isaac (2018) "The Contributions Of United Nations Security Council Resolutions To
The Law Of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence Of Customary International Law," American University Law Review:
Vol. 67 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss3/1
The Contributions Of United Nations Security Council Resolutions To
The Law Of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence Of
Customary International Law
Keywords
Cold War, non-international armed conflicts, U.N. Security Council, Jus Ad Bellum, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, International Law Commission, Vienna Convention





THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTIONS TO THE LAW OF  
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: 
NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
GREGORY H. FOX, KRISTEN E. BOON,** AND ISAAC JENKINS*** 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has become the 
preeminent international actor in the resolution of armed conflicts.  This is 
                                               
  Professor of Law, and Director, Program for International Legal Studies, 
Wayne State University Law School.  J.D., New York University; B.A., Bates College. 
 ** Miriam T. Rooney Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School.  J.S.D., Columbia 
University; J.D., New York University; M.A., McGill University; B.A., McGill University. 
 *** Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, University of Michigan; M.S., University of 
Oxford; B.A, Pomona College. 
 
  Our great appreciation goes to Loraine Sievers for her input and advice 
throughout the conceptualization and execution of this project.  Our thanks also goes 
to Bruce Hemmer for his assistance with the initial methodology of this Article.  We 
also thank the following for their exceptional research assistance:  Marrisa 
Mastroianni, Frank Ricigliani, Amy Cuzzolino, Ameya Pendse, Benjamin King, Zachary 
Deloy, Joanna Harr, Nhan Ho, Brendan Sawyer, Chelsea Everson, Monica Batsford 
and Krista Shaheen.  We benefited from feedback at meetings of the American Society 
of International Law’s International Organization Interest Group and Mid-Year 
Research Forum, the European Society of International Law International 
Organizations Interest Group, and at the Conference on the Role of International 
Organizations and Non-State Actors in the Formation of Customary International Law 
at Manchester University.  We also would like to express our thanks to NYU’s Center 
on International Cooperation for sponsoring a discussion on our findings with U.N. 
Diplomats and Legal Advisors at Security Council Report.  Finally, we would like to 
650 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:649 
especially true of non-international armed conflicts (“NIACs”), such as civil 
wars, which are now far more common than inter-state armed conflicts.  Few, if 
any, scholars have asked whether obligations the Council has imposed on NIAC 
parties should contribute to norms of customary international law regulating 
various aspects of those conflicts.  This Article is the first attempt to fill this gap.  
The analysis is based on a newly compiled data set of all Council resolutions 
passed on the most consequential NIACs from 1990 to 2013.  The data show 
that the U.N. Security Council has regularly obligated NIAC parties to act in 
ways that diverge from otherwise-applicable international law in at least four 
significant areas.  The Article argues that patterns of obligation found in Council 
resolutions on NIACs should serve as important evidence of customary international 
law.  Moreover, failure to account for the Council’s centrality in resolving 
NIACs—substantially exceeding national interventions in scope and frequency—
would consign this critical international practice to a legal black hole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council 
(“Council”) has become the preeminent international actor in the 
resolution of armed conflicts.  This is especially true of non-
international armed conflicts (“NIACs”), now far more common than 
inter-state armed conflicts (“IACs”).1  The Council has developed a 
                                               
 1. SCOTT GATES ET AL., TRENDS IN ARMED CONFLICT, 1946–2014, at 2 (2016) 
(explaining how the dominant form of conflict has shifted from inter-state to internal); 
Therése Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014, 52 J. PEACE RES. 
536, 537 (2015) (“What stands out in the [twenty-first] century is the lack of large-scale 
interstate conflict.  Only one was active in 2014, the conflict between India and Pakistan, 
which led to fewer than [fifty] fatalities.  The remaining [thirty-nine] conflicts were fought 
within states.”).  The legal definition of an IAC is rooted in Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions:  the rules of IACs apply to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”  Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.  By contrast, a NIAC is defined in the negative:  “armed conflict 
not of an international character.”  Id. art. 3.  The question of how to classify particular 
conflicts in international law is contested.  See generally Dapo Akande, Classification of 
Armed Conflicts:  Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION 
OF CONFLICTS 32, 32 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (examining the distinction and 
arguments on classification of conflicts as international or non-international).  In 
classifying conflicts included in our data set, we relied upon definitions from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, from which we drew our overall list of conflicts.  We 
designated conflicts in the following two Uppsala categories as NIACs: (1) “Internal 
Armed Conflict,” which “occurs between the government of a state and one or more 
internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states,” and (2) 
“Internationalized Internal Armed Conflict,” which “occurs between the government 
of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other 
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.”  See UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, 
UCDP/PRIO ARMED CONFLICT DATASET CODEBOOK 9, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/ 
124/c_124920-l_1-k_codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-conflict-dataset-v4_2012.pdf. 
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substantial track record of quelling hostilities in NIACs, assisting in 
negotiating peace agreements, supervising transitions from war to 
peace, and designing new political and legal institutions for the post-
conflict societies.2  No single state or group of states has come close to 
matching the Council’s rate of intervention.3  It is the rare NIAC that 
is not subject to one or more of these Council actions.4 
While the Council’s omnipresence in NIACs is now unremarkable, 
the legal consequences of its actions have hardly been examined.  Few 
have asked whether Council actions can contribute to customary 
international law, let alone whether the specific obligations the 
Council imposes on NIAC parties should contribute to customary 
norms regulating those conflicts.5  Traditional customary law consisted 
                                               
 2. See JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND CIVIL 
WAR:  FIRST INSIGHTS FROM A NEW DATASET 4 (2010) (“Since 1989, the Council has 
deployed U.N. peace operations to twenty-four different countries affected by civil war, 
imposed sanctions on dozens of civil-war parties, and established several transitional 
administrations and international criminal tribunals to address civil wars and their 
consequences.”); ADAM ROBERTS & DOMINIK ZAUM, SELECTIVE SECURITY:  WAR AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1945, at 31 (2008) (discussing the impact the 
Council has had on international war); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, L’Intervention du 
Conseil de Sécurité dans les Conflits Internes, in LE RECOURS À LA FORCE AUTORISÉ PAR LE 
CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ:  DROIT ET RESPONSABILITÉ 67, 67–76 (Karine Bannelier & Cyrille 
Pison eds., 2014); Peter Wallensteen & Patrick Johansson, The United Nations Security 
Council in State-Based Armed Conflicts, 2003–12, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014:  ARMAMENTS, 
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 56, 56 (2014) (studying how the Council 
uses its powers to address conflicts). 
 3. As demonstrated below, the Council passed at least one resolution on 76% of 
all NIACs in the data set we created.  By contrast, interventions by states—either 
individually or in groups—occurred in only 31% of the same conflicts.  See infra notes 
63–68 and accompanying text. 
 4. Of the NIACs in our data set, only three starting after 1990 were not the subject 
of Council resolutions:  Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, and Algeria.  See infra 
notes 59–63 and accompanying text.  Once the Council did address a NIAC, it passed 
a median of fourteen resolutions per conflict and an average of 27.6.  See infra note 122 
and accompanying text. 
 5. The Council receives virtually no attention in leading scholarship on the 
nature of customary law.  See REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW vii–viii 
(Brian D. Lepard ed., 2017)); CUSTOM’S FUTURE:  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 278 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2016); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–83 (2014); see also NOORA ARAJÄRVI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:  METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 56–57 (2014); BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER, 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (2010).  The most recent and 
comprehensive examination of customary international law is the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary 
International Law.  Neither the sixteen draft “conclusions” produced by the 
Commission in June 2016 nor the preparatory reports of the Special Rapporteur 
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of acts by individual states taken out of a sense of legal obligation.6  But, 
if states have repeatedly turned to the Council as their chosen agent to 
address NIACs, a continued focus on state action would elide decades 
of important Council practice across a wide range of conflicts.  The 
result could be—and arguably is—an emerging body of customary 
norms that is increasingly disconnected from how the international 
community actually addresses NIACs. 
Many customary law questions concerning NIACs are the subject of 
fierce debate, and taking account of Council actions could easily 
determine their outcomes.  For example, a debate on whether peace 
agreements that end NIACs are legally binding has been 
indeterminate, but the Council has been clear in its view that parties 
must follow such agreements.7  Similarly, scholars are divided on 
whether non-state rebel groups are bound by human rights 
obligations, but the Council has been consistent and unequivocal in 
applying human rights standards to such groups.8  Another contested 
issue is whether states should hold elections in the immediate 
aftermath of peace settlements in NIACs.  Some scholars argue there 
is no more important time to adhere to international standards of 
democratic politics.9  Others argue that immediate post-conflict 
elections are frequently destabilizing and may actually end up 
                                               
discusses the role of the Security Council in the creation of customary norms.  See 
generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/71/10, at 76–79 (2016) [hereinafter ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom]; Michael 
Wood (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Identification of Customary International Law, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Wood, Third Report].  The same 
is true of the International Law Association’s lengthy report published in 2000.  INT’L 
LAW ASS’N LONDON CONFERENCE, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE 
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (2000). 
 6. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 
13, ¶ 27 (June 3) (“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of 
States.”).  Custom is one of the two primary sources of international law, the other 
being treaties.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(c), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993. 
 7. See infra 14–198 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text. 
 9. Gregory H. Fox, International Law and the Entitlement to Democracy After War, 
9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 179, 183 (2003). 
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undermining democratic transitions.10  The Council has consistently 
sided with the former view.11 
This Article is the first attempt to take account of Council practice 
in addressing these questions.  Our analysis is based on a newly-
compiled data set of all Council resolutions passed on the most 
consequential NIACs from 1990 to 2013.12  Despite deep cleavages over 
Syria, Ukraine, and a few other conflicts, the Security Council has 
imposed a broad and consistent range of obligations on NIAC parties.13  
The Council’s most ambitious undertakings in response to NIACs, 
which are post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction missions, 
have remained active and relatively uncontroversial.14  While the 
weight accorded to the Council’s resolutions varies with each norm in 
question, we argue that, in all cases, this practice should be considered 
relevant evidence of law in the substantive areas we discuss.15  Though 
many scholars have examined the Council’s so-called “legislative 
resolutions”—binding, treaty-like documents obviously intended to 
                                               
 10. See Benjamin Reilly, Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Elections, in BUILDING 
SUSTAINABLE PEACE:  TIMING AND SEQUENCING OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
PEACEBUILDING 72, 73 (Arnim Langer & Graham K. Brown eds., 2016) (examining the 
consequences of holding post-conflict elections too soon after the end of a conflict, 
such as nationalist or ethnic parties instead of policy-driven parties, inclusion instead 
of competitiveness). 
 11. See infra discussion accompanying notes 232–34. 
 12. All data and coding documents can be found at Kristen E. Boon, Gregory H. 
Fox & Isaac Jenkins, Project on the UN Security Council and Non-International Armed 
Conficts, WAYNE ST. U., https://law.wayne.edu/international/securitycouncil-fox (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Project Website].  As described in more detail in Part 
I, we examined only resolutions on conflicts experiencing at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths in at least one conflict year.  See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 13. Kristen E. Boon, Gregory H. Fox & Isaac Jenkins, UN Security Council Data, 
WAYNE ST. U., https://law.wayne.edu/pdfs/unsc_data_for_publication_12-17-17.csv 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter UN Security Council Data Set]. 
 14. LOUISE RIIS ANDERSEN & PETER EMIL ENGEDAL, BLUE HELMETS AND GREY ZONES:  
DO UN MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS WORK? 59 (2013) (stating that U.N.-led 
peace operations are less controversial to the Council than similar U.S. or NATO-led 
missions). 
 15. “Evidence of law” refers to the definition employed by the ILC in its Draft 
Conclusions on Customary International Law, which includes all materials that may be 
relevant to determining the basis of identifying a custom as a source of law.  ILC Draft 
Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 84 n.263 (“The term ‘evidence’ is used here 
as a broad concept relating to all the materials that may be considered as a basis for 
the identification of customary international law, not in any technical sense as used by 
particular courts or in particular legal systems.”). 
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affect international law—our data is the first to assess normative 
patterns across conflict-specific resolutions.16 
The data also allow us to respond to the most common critique of 
using Council practice as evidence of customary law:  that Council 
resolutions address only discrete aspects of specific conflicts and do 
not establish broad, prospective rules of general application.17  The 
dense patterns of obligation we identify are quite similar to the 
repetitive practices of states in traditional customary law.  Our data 
reveal two important conclusions that support giving a prominent role 
to Council practice in any legal analysis of internal conflicts:  first, the 
Council is heavily involved in contemporary NIACs;18 and second, the 
Council has regularly imposed similar binding obligations in these 
conflicts that deviate in critical respects from accepted international 
                                               
 16. The “legislative” or “law-making” resolutions often address issues relating to 
terrorism and are treaty-like in that they set out broad, prospective rules of behavior 
potentially applicable to all member states.  One of the most prominent examples is 
Resolution 1373, which requires all states to interrupt the financing of terrorist 
operations and criminalize the willful provision of such funding.  S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1 
(Sept. 28, 2001).  Another example is Resolution 1540, which requires states to take 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  
S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 2 (Apr. 28, 2004).  A third is Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist 
fighters, in which the Council “decided” that all states shall “prevent and suppress the 
recruiting, organizing, transporting[,] or equipping of individuals who travel to a State 
other than their States of residence or nationality” for the purpose of terrorist acts.  
S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 5 (Sept. 24, 2014).  Unlike most Council actions, these resolutions 
consciously transcend particular conflicts, including the conflict that may have 
triggered Council involvement, by seeking to compel action deemed essential to 
diminishing conflict in general.  See José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law 
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874 (2003).  In Professor Stefan Talmon’s words, these 
resolutions “are phrased in neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases, 
and are not usually limited in time.”  Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World 
Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 176 (2005).  Despite the small number of these 
resolutions, the literature they spawned is now vast.  See, e.g., Mónica Lourdes de la 
Serna Galván, Interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Threat to the Peace) by the Security 
Council:  Is the Security Council a Legislator for the Entire International Community?, 11 
ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DRECHO INTERNACIONAL 147, 148–49 (2011) (analyzing the new 
ways that the Council attempts to determine threats to peace); Nicholas Tsagourias, 
Security Council Legislation, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the Principle of Subsidiarity, 
24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 539, 541 (2011) (filtering the assertion of U.N. legislative power 
through the lens of subsidiarity). 
 17. See, e.g., ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
114 (2007) (criticizing Council for its “essentially ad hoc and unsystematic approach 
to law-making[,] which results from Council action on specific issues”). 
 18. Our data show that the Council passed at least one resolution in 76% all NIACs 
from 1990 to 2013 that we coded, increasing to 80% for NIACs that began after 1990.  
See infra Section VII.A; see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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law.19  Given that the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) 
designates the Council as acting on behalf of all member states on 
issues of peace and security,20 this combination of the Council’s fixture 
in contemporary NIACs and its consistent imposition of similar 
obligations over time make its normative preferences highly 
significant.21  Council resolutions cannot be dismissed as inherently 
political, negotiated compromises or as one-off responses to particular 
crises when we know the Council has imposed the same obligations 
across a wide variety of conflicts over time.22 
We are hardly the first to identify the normative consequences of 
Council practice.  The Council itself is aware that its resolutions may 
affect customary international law; for instance, the Council specified 
in no fewer than eleven resolutions on Somali piracy that the 
authorizations provided in the resolutions “shall not be considered as 
establishing customary international law,” suggesting that absent such 
a disclaimer, the resolutions could in fact have such an effect.23  Of 
                                               
 19. See infra Section VII.A.1.  While important early scholarship explored the 
impact of Council practice on the interpretation of the U.N. Charter, we examine 
exclusively non-Charter norms.  See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2–3 
(1963) (discussing the significance of the Council in the development of international 
law). 
 20. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by 
the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”). 
 21. An additional source of law resulting from Council resolutions, though not 
from the substance of those resolutions, is the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda tribunals, which the Council created in Resolutions 808 and 955.  S.C. Res. 
955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 1993).  Doctrine developed by the 
ad hoc tribunals now permeates international criminal and humanitarian law.  See 
Darryl Robinson & Gillian MacNeil, The Tribunals and the Renaissance of International 
Criminal Law:  Three Themes, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2016) (finding that answers 
provided by ad hoc tribunals to questions of international criminal law “have become 
generally accepted and absorbed as the starting point for any subsequent debate”). 
 22. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 23. S.C. Res. 2184, ¶ 14 (Nov. 12, 2014); S.C. Res. 2182, ¶ 21 (Oct. 24, 2014); 
S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 13 (Nov. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 
2020, ¶ 10 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 1950, ¶ 8 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 8 
(Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 10 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 11 (Dec. 2, 
2008); S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 8 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 9 (June 2, 2008); see also 
Stephen Mathias, The Work of the International Law Commission on Identification of 
Customary International Law:  A View from the Perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs, 15 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 27 (2016) (discussing the language of Resolution 1816).  The 
Council also included identical language in a resolution on Libya.  See S.C. Res. 2146, 
¶ 9 (Mar. 19, 2014). 
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equal importance, many international actors have cited Council 
resolutions as evidence of customary law.  These include the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),24 the International Committee of 
the Red Cross,25 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY),26 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR),27 and the International Law Commission (ILC) in its 
commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.28  But these 
are citations to at most a handful of discrete resolutions.  The question 
is thus not whether individual Council actions can serve as evidence of 
custom but how, much in the manner of consistent state practice, 
patterns of Council-imposed obligations may affect customary law.  We 
are unaware of any prior study of aggregated Council action intended 
to discover patterns of obligation. 
Part I explains the methodology governing our selection and coding 
of Council resolutions on NIACs.  Part II details our findings from the 
data, describes the general extent of Council action, and explains its 
                                               
 24. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 404, ¶ 81 (July 22) 
(finding that a series of Council resolutions do not reveal general condemnation of 
unilateral declarations of independence, which suggests that a different practice might 
lead to the ICJ ascribing normative value to Council practice); see also Marko Divac 
Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the 
Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–80 (2005). 
 25. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 39 n.19, 94 n.97, 100 n.139, 
107 nn.14 & 17, 109 n.24, 111 n.40, 113 nn.6–8, 137 n.60, 147 n.25, 184 n.79, 188 n.22, 
195–96 nn.70–73, 198 n.87, 199 n.98, 201 nn.105–07 (2009) (noting instances where 
Council resolutions contribute to customary law). 
 26. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Of great relevance to the formation of opinio juris  . . . are 
certain resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council.  Thus, for instance, 
in two resolutions on Somalia, where a civil strife was under way, the Security Council 
unanimously condemned breaches of humanitarian law and stated that the authors of 
such breaches or those who had ordered their commission would be held ‘individually 
responsible’ for them.”). 
 27. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2006) 
(discussing Resolutions 827 and 955, which created ICTY and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in support of norm prohibiting domestic amnesties for 
crimes against humanity). 
 28. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, at 121, 175, 217, 227–28, 288–91, 334 (2001) [hereinafter ILC, Rep. 53d 
Sess.] (referring to Security Council resolutions in:  comment (5) of article 11; 
comment (5) of article 20; comment (4) of article 30; comment (10) of article 31; 
comments (7), (8), and (12) of article 41; and comment (5) of article 50). 
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most common normative strategy of invoking and calling for 
adherence to well-established international law.  Part III describes 
three areas in which Council practice may resolve debates over the 
state of customary law:  (1) the human rights obligations of non-state 
actors in NIACs; (2) whether peace agreements ending NIACs are 
legally binding; and (3) the sequencing of democratic transitions in 
post-conflict states.  In Part IV, we explore the potentially radical 
consequence of repeated Council prohibitions on the use of force in 
NIACs:  a nascent jus ad bellum for internal conflicts.  In Part V, we 
assess the significance of this aggregated practice for customary 
international law.  Part VI provides conclusions and recommendations 
for further research. 
There are two areas where this Article does not venture.  First, it does 
not analyze the propriety or legality of Council actions in any depth.  A 
robust literature already explores potential limits on Council 
jurisdiction under Chapter VII, including mechanisms such as judicial 
review designed to police those limits.29  And because our data exhibit 
that the Council has regularly altered law applicable to NIACs for 
almost twenty-five years, it appears that if those limits do exist, they 
have little impact on Council practice.  Second, this Article does not 
seek to measure whether the Council actions identified by the data set 
successfully changed the behavior of actors addressed by its norms.  
Our focus is not on the efficacy of Council practice on NIACs but 
rather on understanding the new legal environment it creates. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
We sought to assess whether the Security Council has responded to 
NIACs by imposing a similar set of legal obligations over time.  
Through this analysis we can seek to determine whether Council 
practice is consistent and uniform in the manner generally required of 
state practice qualifying as evidence of customary international law.30 
 Because there was no existing compilation of Council resolutions 
related to NIACs, however, we created an original data set comprised 
of all Council resolutions on armed conflicts from 1990 to 2013, 
                                               
 29. See, e.g., Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security 
Council:  Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
671, 673 (exploring extra-legal measures through which to conduct oversight of the 
Council, including judicial review by the ICJ or municipal courts). 
 30. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) (consistency); North Sea Continental 
Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20) (uniformity). 
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including those that were ongoing as of 1990.31  We define an “armed 
conflict” as one involving at least 1000 battle-related deaths occurring 
in at least one year of the conflict.32  Because we are interested in the 
Council’s role in promulgating binding legal obligations, for our 
hypothesis, a clear distinction exists between binding and non-binding 
Council statements.33  In coding the resolutions, we therefore 
                                               
 31. We take 1990 to be an important transition point in world history, which ended 
U.S. and Soviet proxy wars in developing countries and ushered in a new focus on 
human rights in the international community.  Relevant scholarship has shown that 
the Council became more willing to address conflicts with assertive resolutions as the 
sweeping effects of the end of the Cold War triggered civil wars around the world.  See 
Lisa Hultman, UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians:  Cheap Talk or Norm 
Implementation?, 50 J. PEACE RES. 59, 60 (2013); Peter Viggo Jakobsen, National Interest, 
Humanitarianism or CNN:  What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?, 33 J. 
PEACE RES. 205, 205 (1996) (observing that the U.N. shift toward peace enforcement 
after the Cold War was considered a very controversial change in U.N. behavior). 
 32. See Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946–2009, 47 J. PEACE 
RES. 501, 501 (2010).  While the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold is not 
uncontested in the literature, we selected this threshold because these severe conflicts 
are most likely to merit inclusion in the Council’s limited agenda time.  For an 
argument for a lower threshold, see Nicholas Sambanis, What Is Civil War?:  Conceptual 
and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 814, 818–19 
(2004), which argues for a threshold of twenty-five deaths.  Our definitional threshold 
reflects two additional choices.  First, there is the question of whether the threshold 
number, whatever it is, should count battlefield deaths or battle-related deaths.  
Maryann Cusimano Love, God and Global Governance:  Resurgent Religion in World Politics, 
in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:  ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA 170, 178 (Maryann Cusimano 
Love ed., 4th ed. 2011).  Because the Security Council has evinced a particular concern 
over conflicts with high civilian casualty rates, we have chosen to use battle-related 
deaths in order to take those concerns into account.  Second, some conflict data sets 
include those with 1000 deaths in at least one conflict year while others include those 
with 1000 deaths over the lifetime of the conflict.  See Charles H. Anderton & John R. 
Carter, Conflict Datasets:  A Primer for Academics, Policymakers, and Practitioners, 22 DEF. & 
PEACE ECON. 21, 35 (2011).  We have chosen the former because it correlates with the 
Security Council’s tendency to focus only on the most destructive conflicts.  See 
VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?:  SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICES 
AFTER CIVIL WAR 19 (2008) (discussing how the Council decides where to send 
peacekeepers); Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to 
Peace:  The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 
819, 819 (2006) (arguing that mediations correlate to the success of an agreement); 
Michael J. Gilligan & Ernest J. Sergenti, Do UN Interventions Cause Peace?:  Using 
Matching to Improve Causal Inference, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 89, 89 (2005) (analyzing the 
effectiveness of U.N. interventions during and after civil war); Mark J. Mullenbach, 
Deciding to Keep Peace:  An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-
Party Peacekeeping Missions, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 529, 529 (2005) (examining how third 
party actors decide to partake in peacekeeping missions). 
 33. We recognize that in some circumstances binding obligations may be 
contained in preambular paragraphs to resolutions and in Presidential Statements 
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established a three-point scale:  (1) clearly non-binding statements; 
(2) statements that may be binding; and (3) statements that are clearly 
binding.34  Whenever possible, we note the percentage of resolutions 
with Chapter VII obligations, the clearest form of binding Council 
obligation, and thus coded as Category 3.35  In order to take account 
of uncertainty in distinguishing binding from non-binding obligations, 
when we describe the percentage of NIACs in which the Council 
imposes a particular obligation, that figure includes all binding or 
potentially binding obligations.36 
The question of how to distinguish binding from non-binding 
Council obligations is not easily answered.  For coding purposes, we 
employed several clear markers to help identify binding obligations:  
citations to Articles 25 or 48 of the U.N. Charter, a Chapter VII 
authorization, or use of verbs at the outset of operative paragraphs 
widely recognized by experts as signaling binding obligations.37  
Although the ICJ has given general guidance on how Security Council 
resolutions are to be interpreted, considerable disagreement persists 
with regard to whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and other approaches to interpretation are applicable to Council 
                                               
issued by the Council.  Because these are rare, however, they are not statistically 
significant, and our study encompasses only the body of Security Council resolutions. 
 34. See infra Appendix I.  In the Israeli Wall case, the ICJ held that Israel had 
“contravened” a number of Security Council resolutions not passed under Chapter VII.  
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 134 (July 9); see also Öberg, supra note 24, at 885 
n.40 (“Only obligations, of course, can be contravened.”). 
 35. See infra Appendix I; see also LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF 
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 389 (4th ed. 2014) (“[W]hen Council members have 
wanted to signal that a resolution is to be understood as being mandatory, the Council 
has almost always either specifically cited Chapter VII or included wording which clearly 
implies reliance on that chapter.” (emphasis added)).  Judge Koroma appears to have 
adopted this view in his dissenting opinion in the Kosovo case.  Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 10 (July 22) (Koroma, J., dissenting) (stating that 
resolution 1244, a resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, is binding). 
 36. Importantly, using this metric allows us to address the critique that some verbs 
on our list may not always signal binding obligations, or that in some cases it may be 
impossible to determine the Council’s intentions.  Such uncertainty would not exist if 
an obligation was imposed under Chapter VII, if the obligation was denominated as a 
“decision,” or if the Council invoked Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter. 
 37. We used the following verbs to signal binding obligations (category one in our 
coding):  Decides, Authorizes, Demands, Determines, Resolves, Condemns, and 
Endorses (if followed by a threat).  See infra Appendix I. 
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resolutions.38  Similarly, states, including the Council’s five permanent 
members (“P5”), disagree on which verbs signal binding obligations in 
resolutions.  Apart from the term “decisions,” no authoritative source 
draws clear categorical distinctions between binding and non-binding 
language.39  Moreover, states have now made public their views on 
which verbs signal binding obligations in Council resolutions, with 
surprising results:  some P5 states view only the verb “decides” as 
signaling a binding obligation, while others declare they are more 
flexible, noting that a reference to Chapter VII would be sufficient.40 
Nonetheless, this uncertainty does not mean that the most restrictive 
views of Council language should cast doubt on the utility of our longer 
list of “binding” verbs.41  International actors citing the Council for 
evidence of custom have invoked resolutions with a broad range of 
verbs, suggesting that the most restrictive views of Council member 
states are not shared by other international actors.42  The ICJ has cited 
resolutions that use “calls upon,” “deplores,” and “strongly reaffirms.”43  
                                               
 38. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21) (articulating that the 
language of a Security Council resolution must be carefully analyzed when evaluating 
its binding effect and that determining whether the powers under Article 25 have been 
exercised requires “regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might 
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council”); 
Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, Revisited, in 20 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. ONLINE 1, 2 (2017); Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation 
of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 73, 74 (1998) 
(offering views on Council resolutions based on practical experience); Michael Wood, 
The Law of Treaties and UN Security Council Resolutions:  Some Reflections, in THE LAW OF 
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 244, 255 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011) 
(outlining the Council’s impact on the law of treaties). 
 39. South West Africa, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 113 (obliging states to adhere to “the decisions 
of the Security Council” made with reference to the U.N. Charter).  Article 25 of the 
U.N. Charter requires member states to carry out “decisions” of the Council.  
U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
 40. The differences of views among member states became clear during the authors’ 
discussions with legal advisors to several national missions to the United Nations. 
 41. Infra Appendix I. 
 42. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 43. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 81 (July 22) (citing 
S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 3 (Nov. 16, 1992) (using “strongly reaffirms”); S.C. Res. 541, ¶ 1 (Nov. 18, 
1983) (using “deplores”); S.C. Res. 217, ¶¶ 4–10 (Nov. 20, 1965) (using “calls upon”)). 
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The ICTY has invoked resolutions with “condemns” and “demands.”44  
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has cited resolutions using 
“demands,” “condemns,” “express its concern,” and “emphasizes.”45  
The IACHR has relied on “calls upon,” preambular paragraphs, and 
resolutions as a whole without citing to particular paragraphs.46  And 
the ILC in commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
cites resolutions using “reaffirms,” “calls upon,” “requests,” “urges,” 
and “deplores.”47  Together, these verbs comprise a broader set of 
binding terms than the data set employed.48  Absent an authoritative 
list, our category of binding indicators is more consistent and perhaps 
more rigorous than current international practice. 
In order to understand whether Council practice provides evidence 
of changing norms in international law, it is necessary to examine how 
the Council intervenes in conflicts.  We perform a descriptive analysis 
of the data, focusing on key variables of interest, to understand how, 
where, and when the Council has made binding decisions.49  We do 
not impose parametric assumptions or provide theoretical predictors 
as covariates.50  Instead, we use the three-point scale for each variable 
                                               
 44. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (citing S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 5 (Dec. 3, 1992) (using “condemns”); 
S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 8 (Mar. 26, 1993) (using “demands”)). 
 45. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 216 (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/SCSL-04-15-T-1234-
searchable.pdf (citing S.C. Res. 1828 using “demands,” S.C. Res. 1633 using 
“condemns,” S.C. Res. 78, using “emphasizes,” and S.C. Res. 954 using “emphasizes”); 
Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary 
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), ¶¶ 28–29 (May 31, 2004) 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/Appeal/131/SCSL-04-14-
AR72(E)-131.pdf (citing S.C. Res. 1071 using “condemns”). 
 46. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 39 (1999) (citing S.C. Res. 237 using “calls upon”). 
 47. ILC, Rep. 53d Sess., supra note 28, at 287 (citing S.C. Res. 687 using 
“reaffirms”); id. at 288 (citing S.C. Res. 662 using “calls upon”); id. at 291 (citing S.C. 
Res. 218 using “requests”); id. (citing S.C. Res. 569 using “urges”); id. at 334 (citing 
S.C. Res. 171 using “deplores”); id. (citing S.C. Res. 332 using “calls upon”). 
 48. For a list of binding terms employed by the data set, see infra Appendix I. 
 49. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 50. Predicting even when the Council passes resolutions, let alone when it imposes 
individual obligations, requires a multi-stage theory of the Council process.  We do not 
attempt to provide such a theory, which would have to account for target conflict 
dynamics, the political influence of the Council membership, and the deterministic 
influence of the P5.  For more on these dynamics, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & 
Alastair Smith, The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership, 54 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 667, 668 (2010), which presents information to support the claim 
that there are few ways to predict which nations are elected to the Council, and Barry 
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of interest to calculate relative frequencies of binding decisions in each 
category and for each conflict.51  Generating the relative frequencies 
involves taking a simple proportion of observations that meet a 
designated threshold over a relevant number of observations drawn 
from the population. 
II. GENERAL FINDINGS 
This Part first provides a general description of the findings and then 
analyzes four specific areas where Council-imposed obligations should 
be considered as providing evidence of customary law:  (1) human 
rights obligations of non-state actors in NIACs; (2) the status of peace 
agreements following NIACs; (3) elections in post-NIAC states; and 
(4) a nascent jus ad bellum for NIACs. 
A. Overview 
Our analysis of 1057 resolutions between 1990 and 2013, 
representing 56 NIACs, shows that the Council is widely involved in 
NIACs and, moreover, that there are patterns to the Council’s 
application of obligations.52  The data show that the Council passed 
resolutions for the majority of NIACs (76%),53 and confirms that it 
became slightly more involved in conflicts that began after 1990 
(80%),54 though it remained very active for both new and legacy 
conflicts.55  The range in the number of resolutions passed on 
individual NIACs is large, from zero resolutions to ninety-seven.56  
When the Council chooses to pass a resolution, it does not involve itself 
lightly; for conflicts contained within our period of study, the average 
duration was 9.8 years, with a median of fourteen resolutions per 
conflict and an average of 27.6.57  Geographically, the Council has been 
                                               
O’Neill, Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council, 40 J. CONFLICT RES. 
219, 219 (1996), which discusses the power associated with voting ability on the Council. 
 51. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 52. A more detailed description of our coding methodology and additional 
descriptive statistics are contained in Appendix II, available at https://law.wayne.edu/ 
pdfs/fox_boon_jenkins_appendix_ii_1-17-18.pdf. 
 53. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. The Council did not pass resolutions during this time period on NIACs in 
Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, or Turkey. 
 57. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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most heavily involved relative to the number of conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Africa.58 
The Council has invoked Chapter VII authorities in 48% of 
conflicts59 and usage of Chapter VII corresponds to the conflicts with 
the highest number of resolutions (such as Bosnia),60 confirming that 
the Council becomes most heavily involved in cases in which not all 
parties to conflict are cooperative.  The top conflict list indicates that 
the Council became most intensely involved in a diverse set of conflicts, 
including some in the former Soviet sphere in the early 1990s and 
some of the most violent African NIACs.61  The top conflicts in terms 
of resolutions per year also include a diverse set:  some are among the 
shortest conflicts—Croatia/Yugoslavia, Iraq/Kuwait62—while others 
among the longest—Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DR Congo”).63 
The Council pursued an array of remedies in response to NIACs.  It 
created twenty-six peacekeeping missions for the conflicts we coded,64 
leading to involvement by peacekeepers in 57% of all these NIACs.65  
During the same period, the Council created a total of fifty-three 
missions—or 76% of all missions ever—to be involved in conflicts, post-
conflict situations, and states with border disputes, though not all such 
conflicts met the threshold for inclusion in the data.66  As expected, 
this represents a substantial increase in involvement after the Cold 
War.67  Further, the Council gave missions Chapter VII mandates in 
48% of conflicts and applied sanctions in a further 35%, which 
                                               
 58. See Andrew S. Cottey, United Nations, in 1 MODERN GENOCIDE:  THE DEFINITIVE 
RESOURCE AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 381, 381 (Paul R. Bartrop & Steven Leonard 
Jacobs eds., 2015) (reflecting on the ways in which the United Nations was heavily 
engaged in the Yugoslav conflict, specifically to discuss international actions in the 
conflict and manage international operations); Gift Phiri, African Nations Push for 
Permanent UNSC Seat, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
indepth/features/2013/09/african-nations-push-for-permanent-unsc-seat-
2013924133231925482.html (emphasizing African calls for an permanent African seat 
on the Council since the Council’s recent agenda has been heavily Afrocentric). 
 59. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 60. Id. 
 61. A list of conflicts coded with a corresponding number of resolutions is available 
at Project Website, supra note 12. 
 62. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., Introduction, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 5–8 (Sebastian von Einsiedel et al. eds., 2016) (acknowledging the 
increase of Council actions after the end of the Cold War due, in part, to the 
cooperation of the permanent Council members). 
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represents 73% of instances where it invoked Chapter VII.68  Thus, the 
Council has robustly applied its most aggressive tools to arrest active 
conflicts during this period. 
B. Enforcement of Existing Norms or Confirmation of Evolved Practice 
A clear pattern emerging from the data is that the Council 
frequently reaffirms existing norms.  In the areas of human rights, 
international humanitarian law (IHL), and individual criminal 
responsibility in particular, the data show that the Council’s normative 
practice reaffirms existing and agreed-upon practices.69  In other 
words, an important role of the Council is to act as an institutional 
enforcer for settled norms and practices in the context of NIACs.70 

















                                               
 68. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 69. See infra Table 1. 
 70. Kristen E. Boon, UN Sanctions as Regulation, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 543, 560–
61 (2016) (explaining the Council’s role as an institutional enforcer to act against and 
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With regard to human rights, in 69% of NIACs that started before 
1990 and included at least one Chapter VII resolution, the Council 
required parties to respect human rights obligations.71  This number 
decreased by 10% of similar conflicts that commenced after 1990.72  
Nonetheless, references to human rights violations increased from 
63% to 67% in the same period.73  In Darfur and Somalia, for example, 
the Council consistently condemned human rights violations by 
government actors.74 
All of these resolutions use as their point of departure existing 
human rights obligations in major multilateral treaties.  A similar 
pattern is apparent with regard to IHL.75  In 75% of NIACs with at least 
one Chapter VII resolution, the Council made a general request to 
comply with IHL obligations, increasing to 83% in post-1990 
conflicts.76  The same is true for individual criminal responsibility.  In 
50% of NIACS, the Council condemned violations of international 
criminal law.77  And in 69% of pre-1990 Chapter VII conflicts, rising to 
83% of post-1990 conflicts, the Council called for perpetrators to be held 
responsible or to be brought to justice.78  There are also numerous 
                                               
 71. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (recording that the Council both 
“[s]trongly condemn[ed] the widespread violations of human rights and [IHL] by the 
Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of [IHL] by armed 
groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence”). 
 74. See S.C. Res. 2158, ¶¶ 12–14 (May 29, 2014) (condemning grave violations 
against children and calling on the federal government in Somalia to actively promote 
respect for and protect human rights); S.C. Res. 2003, ¶ 16 (July 29, 2011) 
(condemning “human rights violations in, and relating to, Darfur, including arbitrary 
arrests and detentions,” by expressing “deep concern about the situation of all those 
so detained, including civil society members and IDPs” . . . and calling “on the 
Government of Sudan fully to respect its obligations, including by fulfilling its 
commitment to lift the state of emergency in Darfur, releasing all political prisoners, 
allowing free expression[,] and undertaking effective efforts to ensure accountability 
for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”). 
 75. Related is the issue of refugees and their rights.  The Council has been prolific 
on the need to adhere to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.  See CHRISTIANE 
AHLBORN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION THROUGH THE 
PRACTICE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 36–37 (2011) (highlighting the need for 
parties to armed conflicts to fully abide by international law, specifically laws and 
provisions relating to women and children). 
 76. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2093, ¶¶ 1, 12 (Mar. 6, 2013); S.C. Res. 1019 ¶¶ 3, 9 (Nov. 9, 
1995); S.C. Res. 820, ¶¶ 7–8 (Apr. 17, 1993); S.C. Res. 771, ¶ 1 (Aug. 13, 1992). 
 77. Resolutions on Bosnia Herzegovina are illustrative.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1882, ¶ 1 
(Aug. 4, 2009); S.C. Res. 1502, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2003); S.C. Res. 1034, ¶¶ 1, 2 (Dec. 21, 
1995); S.C. Res. 819, ¶¶ 6, 7 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
 78. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1355 ¶ 15 (June 15, 2001); S.C. Res. 1231, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 1999). 
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instances in which the Council ordered states to cooperate with 
international criminal tribunals.79  In these subject matter areas, Security 
Council resolutions do not change the law so much as enforce it. 
III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATES OVER EXISTING LAW 
Our second and more significant finding is that Council practice is 
relevant to unresolved debates over customary norms and to the 
emergence of new norms related to NIACs.  The four substantive issues 
we discuss represent a spectrum of norm crystallization.80  In the first 
two, involving non-state actors, the Council has contributed to long-
standing legal debates.  In the third, involving post-conflict elections, 
the Council has affirmed controversial norms of democratic governance 
in circumstances where many argue the norms may be counter-
productive.  In the fourth, the Council has suggested a radical 
departure from existing law by outlining a nascent jus ad bellum for 
NIACs.  The varying nature of these debates suggests that the addition 
of Council practice will have different consequences for different 
norms.  In close cases, such as those involving non-state actors, Council 
practice may well come close to resolving the debates.  In those situations 
where well-established doctrines would need to be revisited—like a jus ad 
bellum for NIACs—Council views may simply serve to widen debates 
about major shifts in custom still in their early stages. 
  
                                               
 79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 5 (Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1649, ¶ 19 (Dec. 21, 2005); 
S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 14 (June 10, 1999); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4 (May 25, 1993). 
 80. See infra Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Council-Imposed Obligations in Three Areas  





























A. Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
A non-state actor is by definition a party to every NIAC.81  The 
traditional gap between robust regulation of IACs and the relatively 
minimal regulation of NIACs is largely attributable to states’ desire for 
maximum discretion in confronting non-state groups as well as a desire 
to avoid legitimizing the groups through their acquisition of legal rights 
                                               
 81. See Non-international Armed Conflict, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, 
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/non-international-armed-conflict (last visited Feb. 
7, 2018) (defining NIACs as “armed conflicts in which one or more non-State armed 
groups are involved”). 
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and obligations.82  The traditional and still dominant view is that “most 
non-state actors, even the most influential of them are neither proper 
law-makers nor subjects of international law.”83  But this statist paradigm 
has been forcefully challenged by functionalist arguments that assert a 
need to recognize greater legal parity among parties to NIACS where 
rebels control substantial territory and in other ways act like states.84 
1. State of the law 
Human rights principles famously helped break the state’s near-
monopoly on legal capacity to acquire rights under international law.85  
But human rights instruments have not expanded obligations beyond 
the state, and the traditional view has been that rebel groups lack the 
                                               
 82. See generally P.H. Kooijmans, The Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties 
to Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 333, 333 (Karl Wellens 
ed., 1998) (discussing the legal implications of Council resolutions that focus on non-
state entities); Anja Mihr, Non-State Actors in Conflict, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
305, 310 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds., 2012) (distinguishing between different types of 
non-state actors by highlighting that some use their position to reach alternative 
goals); Dan Miodownik & Oren Barak, Introduction, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 1 (Dan Miodownik & Oren Barak eds., 2014) (discussing the 
role of external non-state actors in intrastate conflict); Anton O. Petrov, Non-State Actors 
and the Law of Armed Conflict Revisited:  Enforcing International Law Through Domestic 
Engagement, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 279, 279 (2014) (explaining the drawbacks 
of giving non-state actors international law-making powers and offering a similar, or 
better, alternative); Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate 
Actors:  Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 107, 108 (2012) (arguing that non-state actors play a limited role in making 
international law). 
 83. Jean d’Aspremont, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism:  The 
Communitarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:  MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 23, 25 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011) [hereinafter PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM]. 
 84. See William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State 
Actors, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207, 229–40, nn.78–131 (2015) (referring to many sources 
that argue for and against giving non-state actors more authority and power); see also 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligation for Non-State Actors:  Where Are We Now?, in 
DOING PEACE THE RIGHTS WAY:  ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN 
HONOUR OF LOUISE ARBOUR (Fannie Lafontaine & François Larocqu, eds., 
forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2641390 (arguing that non-state actors already have obligations in the 
realm of international human rights). 
 85. Gregory Fox, Navigating the Unilateral/Multilateral Divide, in JUS POST BELLUM:  
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 229, 237 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday 
& Jens Iverson, eds. 2014). 
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legal personality to acquire such obligations under treaty86 or customary 
law.87  Many scholars have rejected this view as rigidly formalist and 
oblivious to the reality of human rights violations in NIACs.88  They point 
out that U.N. human rights bodies now routinely investigate and criticize 
rebel groups.89  Moreover, scholars argue that when such groups and 
                                               
 86. Virtually all human rights treaties are limited to ratification by states.  See, e.g., 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 63, ¶ 1, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217 (“The present Charter shall be open to signature, ratification[,] or 
adherence of the Member States of the Organisation of African Unity.”); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 48, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(“The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of the United 
Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the present 
Covenant.”).  The one exception appears to be the Optional Protocol to the Rights of 
the Child Convention, which provides in Article 4(1):  “Armed groups that are distinct 
from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use 
in hostilities persons under the age of [eighteen] years.”  Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict art. 4, ¶ 1, Feb. 12, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 13,094, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.  But Cedric 
Ryngaert points out that the Protocol has attributes of international humanitarian law, 
which undoubtedly applies to armed groups in certain circumstances, in addition to 
highlighting the use of “should” in Article 4(1) rather than “shall” indicates the article 
is “suggestive rather than binding.”  Cedric Ryngaert, Human Rights Obligations of Armed 
Groups, 41 BELGIAN REV. INT’L L. 355, 364 (2008). 
 87. CEDRIC RYNGAERT & JEAN D’ASPREMONT, INT’L LAW ASS’N, NON STATE ACTORS 10 
(2014) [hereinafter NON STATE ACTORS] (reporting that direct responsibility of armed 
opposition groups “remains hypothetical in the present state of international law”); 
Ryngaert, supra note 86, at 362 (stating that human rights supervisory bodies have never 
given non-state actors human rights responsibilities as a matter of law); see also Robert 
McCorquodale, Overlegalizing Silences:  Human Rights and Nonstate Actors, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 384, 384 (2002) (“The international human rights law system is a state-based 
system, a system in which the law operates in only one area:  state action.  It ignores 
actions by nonstate actors . . . .  Nonstate actors are treated as if their actions could not 
violate human rights, or it is pretended that states can and do control all their activities.”). 
 88. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6 n.20 (referencing scholars who argue 
non-state actors can be bound to comply with international humanitarian law).  Some 
cite Security Council resolutions in support of this claim.  See, e.g., Dapo Akande & 
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief 
Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 483, 487 n.15 (2016) (discussing Council 
resolutions to argue that “[i]n recent years there has been a shift towards imputing 
obligations to comply with human rights on non-State armed groups in situations 
where they exercise effective control over territory and populations and discharge a 
degree of public and administrative functions”). 
 89. There is disagreement about whether the recommendations issued by these 
bodies address states or the groups themselves.  Compare Clapham, supra note 84, at 6 
(discussing how “nearly all speeches and statements at the [United Nations] refer to 
human rights violations being committed by armed groups,” sometimes clearly 
condemning human rights violations committed by those groups), with Jean-Marie 
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not the government control significant portions of national territory, 
holding the groups accountable is the only means of securing the 
rights of local inhabitants.90  Many states respond that holding rebel 
groups accountable would implicitly acknowledge their capacity to 
govern, which in turn would accord them an unwarranted legitimacy.91 
The uncertainty surrounding this debate is amplified by 
disagreements among proponents over the precise content of rebel 
groups’ human rights obligations.92  Views range from the full 
complement of rights set out in the Universal Declaration,93 to a short 
list of peremptory norms,94 to a more flexible approach that would 
apply human rights “to the extent appropriate to the context.”95 
2. Security Council practice 
The Council ordered non-state actors to respect human rights in 
35% of all NIACs in the data set.96  It imposed those obligations in 68% 
of NIACs in which it had invoked Chapter VII and in 83% of such 
conflicts that commenced after 1990.97  Relatedly, the Council called 
for state and non-state perpetrators of human rights violations to be 
held accountable in 73% of NIACs in which it had invoked Chapter 
VII.98  And in 82% of NIACs in which it invoked Chapter VII, the 
                                               
Henckaerts & Cornelius Wiesener, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups:  
A Possible Contribution from Customary International Law?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 146, 148 (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds., 
2013) (stating that monitoring bodies have not addressed the responsibility of armed 
groups themselves). 
 90. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6. 
 91. Id. at 7. 
 92. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 511 (2006) [hereinafter Clapham, Human 
Rights Obligations] (examining demands by international organizations for rebels to 
comply with human rights obligations outside the boundaries of humanitarian law). 
 93. Id. at 505–06 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur Philip Alston as saying that 
non-state actors must still comply with the requirements of the international 
community as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 94. See id. at 506 (listing rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly, 
expression, family life, and democratic participation as human rights norms that non-
state actors must still respect). 
 95. Id. at 502 (arguing that the basis for human rights obligations that non-state 
actors must respect should simply be the extent to which resources are available within 
the economic and social situation of the conflict). 
 96. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Council mandated a peacekeeping mission to protect human rights, 
regardless of the identity of the violator.99 
The Council has called on rebel groups by name to cease activities 
that violate human rights, including the right to security of the 
person.100  In the DR Congo, for example, it condemned 
sexual violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare and 
atrocities perpetrated in the Ituri area by the Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo (MLC) and the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie/National (RCD/N) troops, as well as the acts of 
violence recently perpetrated by the Union des Patriotes Congolais 
(UPC) forces.101 
More frequently, the Council has demanded that “all parties” or “all 
factions and forces” or “armed groups” cease such acts.102  An example 
is the conflict in Mali, where, in early 2012, Taureg rebels along with 
Ansar Dine and other Islamist groups took control of much of the 
northern part of the country.103  After issuing a Presidential Statement 
condemning acts by the rebels,104 the Council invoked Chapter VII and 
called on “all parties in the North of Mali to cease all abuses of human 
rights and violations of international humanitarian law.”105  It repeated 
the same demand three months later, again invoking Chapter VII.106  
While a transitional government soon took control in Mali and a 
French-led intervention reversed rebel gains, in December the Council 
remained concerned that the “entrenchment of terrorist groups and 
criminal networks in the north of Mali continue[d] to pose a serious 
                                               
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2127, ¶ 17 (Dec. 5, 2013) (condemning acts of violence and 
violations of international humanitarian law by non-state actors in Central African 
Republic); S.C. Res. 2067, ¶ 18 (Sept. 18, 2012) (condemning violent actions and 
attacks by terrorist groups and their affiliates in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1663, ¶ 7 (Mar. 24, 
2006) (condemning armed attacks against civilians in Sudan). 
 101. S.C. Res. 1468, ¶ 2 (Mar. 20, 2003). 
 102. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (Syria); S.C. Res. 2046, ¶ 7 (May 2, 
2012) (South Sudan); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (Sudan/Darfur); S.C. Res. 
1814, ¶ 16 (May 15, 2008) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 1341, ¶ 9 (Feb. 22, 2001) (DR Congo); 
S.C. Res. 1181, ¶ 12 (July 13, 1998) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 876, ¶ 4 (Oct. 19, 1993) 
(Georgia/Abkhazia). 
 103. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Government of Mali, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, 
http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=72&entityType=0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 104. S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/9 (Apr. 4, 2012). 
 105. S.C. Res. 2056, ¶ 13 (July 5, 2012). 
 106. S.C. Res. 2071, ¶ 5 (Oct. 12, 2012) (demanding that “all groups in the north 
of Mali cease all abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian 
law, including targeted attacks against the civilian population, sexual violence, 
recruitments of child soldiers and forced displacements”). 
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and urgent threat to the population throughout Mali.”107  Again 
invoking Chapter VII, it authorized an African-led peacekeeping 
mission, which was tasked in part to “support the Malian authorities in 
recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of 
terrorist, extremist[,] and armed groups and in reducing the threat 
posed by terrorist organizations.”108 
When rebel groups fail to heed Council directives they are 
increasingly targeted with sanctions.109  Only four of the sixteen 
Council sanctions regimes in place in 2017 targeted state actors 
exclusively; the rest targeted non-state actors exclusively or both state 
and non-state actors.110 
3. Conclusions 
The Security Council has consistently supported application of 
human rights obligations to non-state parties in NIACs.  It has done so 
by condemning such groups by name and by including them in 
demands that all parties cease human rights abuses and respect human 
rights.111  Moreover, the Council has empowered peacekeeping 
missions to secure rights against violation by non-state groups.112  The 
Council has thus weighed in on the anti-statist side of a debate when 
                                               
 107. S.C. Res. 2085, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 108. Id. ¶ 9(b).  In a November report outlining a proposed United Nations 
presence in Mali, the Secretary-General recommended that “a strong United Nations 
human rights component should be envisaged as part of a multidimensional United 
Nations presence to monitor, report publicly and respond to violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties.”  U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/894 (Nov. 28, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 109. See Nigel D. White, Sanctions Against Non-State Actors, in COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, 
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 148–49 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 2016) 
(examining the Council’s actions in progressively increasing sanctions in cases of non-
compliance in the context of the National Union for the Tital Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) rebel group in Angola). 
 110. The Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions 
(SPITS), SPITS Sanctions List 2017, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://pcr.uu.se/ 
digitalAssets/165/c_165534-l_1-k_spits-sanctions-list-2017.pdf (listing all current and 
terminated sanctions with four “government only” targets—Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iran, North Korea—and either “non-state actors” or a combination of the two as the 
remaining targets). 
 111. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2216, at 2, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2015) (condemning the military 
escalation by the Houthis and calling on all parties to respect human rights 
obligations). 
 112. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1925, ¶ 12 (May 28, 2010) (allowing the peacekeeping 
mission in DR Congo to use the force necessary to protect civilians from violence 
initiated by any party in the conflict). 
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confronted with the question of whether the traditional human rights 
regime applies beyond state actors.  The value of Council practice as 
evidence for customary law is enhanced by the breadth of its 
condemnations, which run from “human rights” abuses generally113 to 
specific obligations, such as those regarding child soldiers114 and sexual 
violence.115  Using Council practice as evidence of customary law is also 
enhanced by its efforts to achieve compliance through sanctions 
regimes and the dispatch of peacekeeping missions. 
B. Status of Peace Agreements Ending NIACs 
NIACs increasingly terminate through peace agreements, which are 
often detailed documents covering not only the end of hostilities but 
also a complex set of steps designed to achieve reconciliation and 
return the post-conflict state to its full functioning status.116  Are these 
agreements legally binding?  This question is of interest to 
international lawyers for two principal reasons.  First, binding 
agreements may more successfully accomplish their objectives than 
non-binding agreements.  In the realm of inter-state agreements, 
evidence suggests that the reputational capital that states invest in 
binding as opposed to non-binding instruments may lead to greater 
levels of compliance.117  The same may be true of NIAC parties.  
                                               
 113. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2014, ¶ 2 (Oct. 21, 2011) (condemning both human rights 
violations and human rights abuses by the Yemeni government and other actors). 
 114. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1493, ¶ 13 (July 28, 2003) (condemning the use of child 
soldiers in the hostilities in the DR Congo). 
 115. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2017) (condemning sexual and gender-based 
violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)). 
 116. See CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE:  PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX 
PACIFICATORIA 28 (2008) (discussing the rise of peace agreements as a method to end 
civil conflicts following the end of the Cold War); Joakim Kreutz, How Civil Wars End 
(and Recur), in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CIVIL WARS 349, 356 (Edward Newman & Karl 
DeRouen, Jr. eds., 2014) (exploring the impact on the duration of a civil war when it 
is ended with a peace agreement); see also Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Peace 
Agreements or ‘Pieces of Paper’?  The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and 
Their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 941, 943–44 (2010) (describing the Security 
Council’s inclusion of roles for women in its efforts to end armed conflicts through 
peace agreements); Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 82, at 144–46 (describing the 
substance of recently implemented peace agreements). 
 117. For a variety of perspectives on signaling, reputation, and expectations, see 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 427–28 (2010), which examines the difference between attempting 
to enforce binding agreements on one hand and utilizing norms and reputational 
pressures on the other to support compliance in post-conflict settlements with non-
state actors; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG.  
175, 176, 193 (1993), which explains how the international community seeks to raise 
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Second, some NIAC peace agreements contain full or partial 
amnesties, the enforcement of which may turn on whether the 
agreement as a whole is legally binding.118  The question of whether 
NIAC peace agreements are binding under international law is thus an 
important one. 
1. State of the law 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (VCLT) iconic 
definition of a treaty is limited to agreements between states.119  
However, a savings clause in VCLT Article 3 provides that the 
definition does not affect the legal status of agreements “between 
States and other subjects of international law.”120  The question for 
peace agreements ending NIACs, then, is whether the non-state rebel 
parties may be considered “subjects of international law.”121 
Three major views are evident in international practice and 
scholarship.122  The first, exemplified by the decision of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone in the case of Prosecutor v. Kallon,123 asserts that 
rebel groups lack the requisite legal personality to enter into binding 
agreements.124  The second argues that peace agreements may be 
                                               
compliance levels by using reputational pressures; and Beth A. Simmons, International 
Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 
94 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 819, 819–20 (2000), which links post-conflict settlements to 
financial incentives in order to support compliance. 
 118. Francesca Lessa et al., Persistent or Eroding Impunity?  The Divergent Effects of Legal 
Challenges to Amnesty Laws for Past Human Rights Violations, 47 ISR. L. REV. 105, 112, 130–31 
(2014) (indexing 161 domestic and international judicial challenges to sixty-three different 
amnesties where only some of the challenged amnesties originated in peace agreements). 
 119. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(a), art. 46, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 120. Id. art. 3. 
 121. Id.; see Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, supra note 92, at 492. 
 122. Discussion of this issue can often become circular.  See Jan K. Kleffner, Peace 
Treaties, in 8 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2012) (“It is commonly held that an international legal person 
is an entity that possesses rights and obligations under international law, while the 
determination of whether such rights and obligations exist draws on whether the 
addressee of those rights and obligations possesses international legal personality.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 123. Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction:  Lomé 
Accord Amnesty (Mar. 13, 2004), http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/ 
2004.03.13_Prosecutor_v_Kallon_Norman_Kamara.pdf. 
 124. Id. ¶ 1.  This case concerned the Lomé Agreement of July 7, 1999, which ended 
the civil war between the government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone (RUF).  See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and 
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-RUF, art. I, July 7, 1999, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceA
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binding under certain circumstances.125  These circumstances include 
the scope and duration of a NIAC126 and the intent of the state and 
international organization subject to the agreement.127  The third view 
is that efforts to fit NIAC agreements into existing legal categories face 
fundamental limitations.128 
2. Security Council practice 
Council practice on this fraught question has been consistent and 
clear:  non-state parties are obligated to comply with NIAC peace 
agreements they have signed.129  The negotiation and implementation 
of most such agreements now involves the Council ex ante, ex post, or 
both.130  Fifty percent (23/46) of the NIACs in our data set have peace 
                                               
greement.pdf [hereinafter Lomé Peace Agreement].  The Lomé Agreement 
contained a broad amnesty provision that the defendants argued precluded the Court 
from exercising jurisdiction.  Id. art. IX.  The prosecution responded that the Lomé 
Agreement was not a “treaty,” and thus, the amnesty provision could not be opposed 
against Sierra Leone.  Kallon, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), ¶¶ 2, 32.  The Appeals Chamber 
sided with the prosecution, conceding that while the RUF might possess the legal 
capacity for purposes of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
“[i]nternational law does not seem to have vested them with such [treaty-making] 
capacity.”  Id. ¶ 48.  While the Court did not discuss the VCLT definition, and its 
reasoning on the treaty issue is frustratingly elliptical, it appeared to fix on the RUF’s 
inability to function as a state as a decisive factor.  Id. ¶ 41. 
 125. See Antonio Cassesse, The Special Court and International Law:  The Decision 
Concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1130, 1134 (2004). 
 126. Id. (explaining the ways in which non-state actors can obtain standing to enter 
into agreements through objective demonstrations of legitimacy such as long term 
control over territories). 
 127. Id. at 1135 (determining the binding quality of the agreements by examining 
the intent of the parties).  Others taking this more positive viewpoint to generally 
accept that rebel groups are bound by international humanitarian law as well as state 
practice of concluding agreements with other non-state groups include indigenous 
peoples and national liberation movements.  See Tom Grant, Who Can Make Treaties:  
Other Subjects of International Law, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 125, 133–34 
(Duncan Hollis ed., 2012) (indigenous peoples); Daragh Murray, How International 
Humanitarian Law Treaties Bind Non-State Armed Groups, 20 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 
101, 101–02 (2015) (humanitarian law); Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 3:  International 
Agreements Not Within the Scope of the Present Convention, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES:  A COMMENTARY 49, 69 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 
2012) (national liberation movements). 
 128. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 116, at 949. 
 129. See White, supra note 109, at 148–49. 
 130. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 1, 6 (May 17, 1994) (expressing both reaffirmation 
of the United Nations commitment to the peacekeeping efforts (ex ante) in Rwanda, 
and “stressing the importance” of the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement 
(ex post)). 
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agreements.131  The Council ordered non-state parties to abide by peace 
agreements in 83% of those conflicts and in 92% of Chapter VII conflicts.132  
Perhaps the strongest indication of the Council’s determination to treat 
NIAC peace agreements as binding is the sanctions regimes it has created 
to punish violation of the agreements.  It did so in Liberia,133 Rwanda,134 
Sierra Leone,135 Côte d’Ivoire,136 and the DR Congo.137 
In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the Council strongly backed the 
January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord to end a conflict that had 
started the previous year.138  In May 2003, finding the situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire to constitute a “threat to international peace,” the Council 
established a peacekeeping mission “with a mandate to facilitate the 
implementation by the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement.”139  The peace process had effectively collapsed by 
November of that year, however, as rebel forces that refused to disarm 
resumed fighting.140  In early 2004, the Council invoked Chapter VII to 
call on the parties “to carry out expeditiously their responsibilities 
under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.”141  On November 15, with 
hostilities unabated, the Council invoked Chapter VII again to 
emphasize “that there can be no military solution to the crisis and that 
the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III 
Agreements remains the only way to resolve the crisis persisting in the 
country.”142  It imposed an arms embargo on the entire country and a 
                                               
 131. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 132. Id. 
 133. S.C. Res. 1521, ¶ 2(a) (Dec. 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1343, ¶ 14(b) (Mar. 7, 2001); 
S.C. Res. 788, ¶ 8 (Nov. 19, 1992). 
 134. S.C. Res. 918, ¶¶ 5, 14(b)–(c) (May 17, 1994) (seeking to punish violations of 
earlier peace agreements in Rwanda by increasing the presence of troops, as well as by 
implementing an embargo against the importation of specific goods related to war making). 
 135. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6 (Oct. 8, 1997) (admonishing violations of peace treaties in 
Sierra Leone by imposing an embargo on material for war making as well as petroleum). 
 136. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 6–7 (Nov. 15, 2004) (punishing violations of earlier peace 
agreements in Côte D’Ivoire by strengthening the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the 
area and imposing an embargo on war making material). 
 137. S.C. Res. 1596, ¶ 1 (May 3, 2005); S.C. Res. 1493, ¶¶ 6, 18, 20 (July 28, 2003). 
 138. S.C. Res. 1464, 1, ¶ 1 (Feb. 4, 2003) (endorsing the agreement and calling on 
“all Ivorian political forces to implement it fully and without delay”). 
 139. S.C. Res. 1479, ¶ 2 (May 13, 2003). 
 140. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2004/42 (Nov. 6, 2004) (demanding cessation of all 
military activities without success). 
 141. S.C. Res. 1527, ¶ 4 (Feb. 4, 2004). 
 142. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 3 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
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travel ban and asset freeze “in particular [on] those who block the 
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements.”143 
3. Conclusions 
Council practice evidences scant willingness to excuse or ignore 
non-state actors’ violation of NIAC peace agreements.144  The Council 
consistently asserts that compliance is essential and punishes the most 
egregious violations with sanctions.145  While the Council has not 
explicitly described the agreements as binding under international 
law, the logic of the Council’s post-conflict strategy would be difficult 
to understand if it regarded the agreements as optional.  The 
agreements contain all the obligations of the parties later approved 
and elaborated upon in resolutions:  demobilization of combatants, 
promotion of human rights and democratic institutions, constitutional 
reforms, and a host of other conflict-abatement devices.146  An option 
to back out of these commitments would undo all subsequent Council 
actions.  The Council’s contribution to an uncertain question of treaty 
law thus clearly supports that the agreements are binding and as such 
is evidence of customary international law. 
As with the human rights obligations of non-state actors, questions 
follow about how one would conceptualize non-state actors’ 
responsibility for breaching NIAC peace agreements.147  While this 
Article does not explore that complex question, a more 
straightforward consequence of viewing the agreements as binding is 
that amnesty provisions—such as the Lomé Agreement—might be 
successfully invoked in national or international courts.  Another is 
that breach of a binding agreement by a non-state party might more 
                                               
 143. Id. ¶ 9. 
 144. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 145. One could certainly go farther and argue that Council resolutions make the 
agreements binding.  See Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, Are Agreements between States and 
Non-State Entities Rooted in the International Legal Order?, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND 
THE VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 1, 18 (arguing that the Council extends 
legitimacy to peace agreements between states and non-state actors by endorsing those 
peace agreements and granting them a place in the “international order”). 
 146. E.g., Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, art. 7, ¶ 4, January 23, 
2003, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_030123_Linas
MarcousisAgreement.pdf; accord S.C. Res. 1464, ¶¶ 1, 9 (Feb. 4, 2003) (endorsing and 
expanding upon the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to end fighting in the Côte 
D’Ivoire). 
 147. See Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener, Engaging Non-State Armed Actors 
in State- and Peace-Building:  Options and Strategies, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 603, 618 
(2011) (exploring NGO practices on convincing non-state actors to comply with 
international norms). 
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clearly relieve third party guarantors—such as the United Nations or a 
regional organization—of obligations under the agreement.  Yet a 
third is that breach by a state party could lead to state responsibility. 
C. Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The reconstruction of states emerging from NIACs presents an 
extraordinary challenge.  The NIACs in our data set are among the 
longest and most deadly of the post-Cold War era.148  In addition, they 
have frequently cleaved states along ethnic, religious, or political lines, 
calling into question the states’ capacity to function as cohesive 
political units even after conflict has abated.149  To return the states’ 
governing institutions to full function—or to create fully functional 
institutions if they did not exist prior to the conflict—requires building 
trust across deep lines of social division.150  Popular acceptance of a 
new national politics normalizes negotiated peace, allows for stability, 
and lessens the possibility that violence will relapse.151  Factions whose 
members have internalized the mutual antagonism of sub-state 
identities are often incapable of building national institutions that 
benefit both themselves and their opponents,152 hence the need for 
external assistance.153 
Building a functional state requires addressing a broad range of 
issues, which complicates isolating the normative aspects of post-
conflict reconstruction.  Some aspects of reconstruction cannot be 
easily connected to a defined norm or set of norms in international 
law; the demobilization of combatants, the rebuilding of 
infrastructure, and the resumption of normal economic activity, for 
                                               
 148. See Paul Collier et al., On the Duration of Civil War, 41 J. PEACE RES. 253, 259 (2004) 
(examining, through an econometric method, how long civil wars last and the reasons why 
some last longer than others); see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 149. See STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 14, 390 (2006) 
(providing an overview of cleavages in civil war). 
 150. C.f. Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing Peace:  Power-Sharing 
and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 318, 322 (2003) (examining 
the severity of deficits in trust following civil wars, specifically noting salient causal 
factors such as death tolls). 
 151. MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE:  
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 19 (2006). 
 152. See Christoph Zürcher, Building Democracy While Building Peace, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 
81, 82 (2011) (addressing how in many cases, the parties to a conflict may alone be 
unable to reach successful and fair democratic arrangements post-conflict, 
necessitating the presence of international actors). 
 153. Id. 
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example, are not the subject of normative obligations.154  But other 
reforms now typical of reconstruction draw heavily on human rights.  
The reconstitution of justice systems and the ways in which nations 
determine the best means for addressing violations by prior regimes 
are two prevalent examples.155  Often these efforts are embedded in a 
process of creating a new constitutional order for the state.156  Our data 
show that in post-1990 conflicts with peacekeeping missions and 
binding or potentially binding resolutions, the Council directed the 
missions to protect human rights in 58% of conflicts and 82% of those 
that invoked Chapter VII.157 
1. State of the law 
The normative undertaking that best captures the contemporary 
approach to post-conflict reconstruction is the creation of democratic 
processes as embodied in free and fair elections.158  Elections 
institutionalize principles of inclusion and seek to build citizen loyalty 
to post-conflict states as opposed to ethnic or other sub-state 
identities.159  Viewing elections as a post-conflict stabilization tool 
began in the post-Cold War era as part of a broader ascendance of 
                                               
 154. See Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms:  A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 119, 131 
(2010) (finding that the Transitional Authority in Cambodia only participated in 
reconstruction of infrastructure and demobilization of combatants at the behest of the 
Council, not as a generally accepted norm). 
 155. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of 
Conflict, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009); see also Elena Baylis, 
What Internationals Know:  Improving the Effectiveness of Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives, 
14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243, 277 (2015) (discussing how rebuilding justice 
systems post-conflict challenges “internationals” because each instance is unique and 
in many ways influenced by the nation’s pre-conflict government structure). 
 156. See JAMAL BENOMAR, CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND PEACE BUILDING:  LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESSES OF POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 6 
(2003) (addressing issues related to post-war constitutional construction, including 
the importance of having the right parties at the table and the importance of drafting 
interim agreements along the way); UNITED NATION DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP 
GUIDANCE NOTE ON CONSTITUTION-MAKING SUPPORT 3 (2014) [hereinafter UNDP 
GUIDANCE] (explaining that rebuilding post-conflict political processes promotes 
accountability, rule of law, and protection of human rights). 
 157. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 158. See UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 28 
(2008) (identifying effective elections as an important step in the process of 
rehabilitating a nation after a civil war). 
 159. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 46, 58–59 (1992) (stating that allowing everyone to vote, as opposed to limiting 
the privilege to a small group or certain territory, turns an exclusionary practice into 
a universal participatory right). 
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participatory rights; an idea Professor Thomas Franck labelled the 
“democratic entitlement.”160  Built on human rights treaty 
commitments to free and fair elections and the increasingly 
widespread practice of election monitoring by the United Nations and 
regional organizations, the entitlement found additional support in 
General Assembly resolutions, membership criteria of international 
organizations, and decisions of international tribunals.161  The Council 
also made frequent reference to the need for democratic transitions in 
states in which it was engaged.162 
But applying the democratic entitlement to post-conflict societies 
has proven difficult and controversial.163  While the United Nations has 
promoted elections as essential to legitimacy of the new political order, 
critics have pointed out the potential dangers accompanying electoral 
competition held immediately after conflict ends.164  Scholars of 
international affairs argue that quick elections in states emerging from 
ethno-nationalist conflicts are positively correlated with a return to 
conflict.165  This widely-discussed claim has given rise to a debate over 
how the timing and design of post-conflict elections should relate to 
other reconstruction imperatives—such as establishing security and 
creating effective state institutions—that will affect the perceived 
legitimacy of elections.166  The question of whether the democratic 
                                               
 160. Id. at 46. 
 161. See Gregory H. Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, in THE MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 122, at 15, 19 
(examining the usefulness of U.N. agencies and affiliates in enforcing democratic 
ideals in a nation); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International 
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 48 (Gregory H. Fox & 
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Fox, Right to Political Participation] (raising 
questions about what effect the fostering of democratic ideals in post-conflict countries 
has on the idea of a democratic entitlement). 
 162. See Gregory H. Fox, Democratization, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:  FROM THE COLD 
WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 69, 72 (David Malone ed., 2003) (addressing the trend in recent 
decades towards democracy as the de facto preferred form of national governance); 
Francesco Mancini, Promoting Democracy, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, supra note 67, at 235, 240, 249 (demonstrating instances in which the 
Council specifically urged referenda or elections to take place in post-conflict nations). 
 163. See generally Fox, supra note 9, at 180 (injecting a legal perspective into an 
already fraught debate over the effectiveness and desirability of promoting democratic 
institutions in post-conflict states). 
 164. See JACK L. SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE:  DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
NATIONALIST CONFLICT 32 (2000) (examining the risks of nationalism in electoral 
contests held shortly after the end of a civil war). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See UNDP GUIDANCE, supra note 156, at 24 (“In post conflict countries in 
particular, there is often a strong push for a speedy constitutional review process . . . .  
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entitlement extends to the immediate post-conflict transitional period 
thus remains controversial. 
2. Security Council practice 
Supporting and facilitating democratic transitions has been an 
important part of the Security Council’s strategy for post-conflict states.  
In 63% of all NIACs with Chapter VII, the Council tasked a 
peacekeeping mission with assisting in the creation of democratic 
institutions.167  For Chapter VII conflicts, 71% were tasked to assist in 
the transformation of national institutions, 65% with establishing the 
rule of law, and 53% with supporting free and fair elections.168 
Resolutions authorizing peacekeeping missions in East Timor,169 
Mali,170 Sudan,171 South Sudan,172 Liberia,173 Somalia,174 and elsewhere 
affirm the Council’s belief in the palliative effect of democratic 
transitions on formerly warring factions.175  The clearest examples of 
the Council approving electoral democracy as appropriate for post-
conflict states are the so-called international territorial administrations 
of the 1990s in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia.176  These involved 
international actors directing elaborate democratic reform initiatives, 
involving not only elections but also wholesale constitutional revisions 
designed to embed pluralism and tolerance into the political culture.177 
                                               
However, experience from numerous constitutional processes indicates that short 
deadlines are almost never met in reality and, in fact, are often a hindrance to the 
broader goal of designing a constitution which reflects the will of the people, and is 
based on meaningful consultations with a broad cross-section of society.”); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Identical Letters dated 17 June 2005 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, ¶ 141 (June 17, 2015) (acknowledging that 
calling for elections too early in a nation’s rehabilitative process may have adverse 
effects that lead to further bloodshed and war). 
 167. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 168. Id. 
 169. S.C. Res. 1704, ¶ 1 (Aug. 25, 2006). 
 170. S.C. Res. 2100, ¶ 4 (Apr. 25, 2013). 
 171. S.C. Res. 1881, ¶ 1 (Aug. 6, 2009); S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
 172. S.C. Res. 1996, ¶ 1 (July 8, 2011). 
 173. S.C. Res. 2066, ¶ 1 (Sept. 17, 2012). 
 174. S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 1 (May 2, 2013). 
 175. Each of these resolutions either invoked Chapter VII, described the situation 
as a “threat to the peace,” or “decided” to grant the mission a pro-democracy mandate, 
meaning they were all coded as imposing binding obligations. 
 176. See S.C. Res. 1272, ¶¶ 1–2 (Oct. 25, 1999) (East Timor); S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11 
(June 10, 1999) (Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1031, ¶ 6 (Dec. 15, 1995) (Bosnia). 
 177. See GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 115–17 (2008) (exploring 
why the international community rejected models of statehood and implemented 
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3. Conclusions 
Despite skepticism about the utility or desirability of moving post-
conflict states decisively toward electoral democracy, Council practice 
shows no diversion in these settings from the broader democratic 
entitlement.178  Certainly none of its missions have promoted alternative 
forms of governance.  The Council has engaged with issues of democracy 
almost exclusively in the context of post-conflict reconstruction,179 
evidencing a strong and consistent commitment to promotion of 
democratic solutions in divided societies.  While other U.N. bodies 
have warned repeatedly against imposing externally designed models 
of democratic government on post-conflict states,180 the Council 
apparently views immediate democratic transitions to be essential. 
Because this norm also has political character, the Council’s practice 
in the area is evidence of an emerging customary norm, although the 
norm is not as well developed as the examples of human rights norms 
and non-state actors, and the status of peace agreements. 
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATE OVER NEW LAW: 
A JUS AD BELLUM FOR NIACS? 
 In addition to addressing the long-standing legal debates discussed 
in Section III, the Council has also weighed in on a new issue:  whether 
NIAC parties have a jus ad bellum obligation to cease hostilities. 
A. The Council’s Challenge to a Purely Inter-State Jus Ad Bellum 
One of the most common obligations the Council has imposed on 
NIAC parties is to cease hostilities entirely.  It did so in 82% of all 
NIACs in which it invoked Chapter VII and in 100% of such NIACs that 
                                               
commitments to pluralism and democracy in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia); Kristen 
Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones:  Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 293, 298 (2005) (discussing post-
conflict legislative agendas that include democratic reforms). 
 178. Mancini, supra note 162, at 243 (noting that despite wide-spread criticism on 
the Council’s use of democracy promotion, the Council has been devoted to creating 
free and fair elections since 2002 under Chapter VII). 
 179. See, e.g., Roland Rich, Situating the UN Democracy Fund, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
423, 426 (2010) (finding that the three most recent U.N.-Secretaries General have 
prioritized democracy building). 
 180. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE:  ORIENTATIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT 3 (2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-
development/For%20WEB%20Accountability%20and%20democratic%20governanc
e%20Orientations%20and%20principles%20for%20development.pdf (noting that 
outside states cannot impose on other states a “one-size-fits-all” plan for development). 
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began after 1990.181  These demands are unconditional and exceptions 
are quite rare,182 though several are discussed below.183  The Council 
has even demanded that both parties end fighting in conflicts where 
one side has committed extraordinarily brutal acts, and the Council 
itself has denounced the brutality.184  Echoing canonical language in 
the U.N. Charter addressing inter-state disputes, the Council often 
explains that there can be no military solution to domestic disputes 
and urges parties either to engage in peace talks or adhere to peace 
agreements already negotiated.185  In Georgia, for example, the 
Council declared that the parties’ differences “must be addressed 
through negotiations and by peaceful means only.”186  In Sudan, it 
declared that “there can be no military solution to the conflict in 
Darfur, and that an inclusive political settlement . . . [is] essential to re-
establishing peace in Darfur.”187  Where a peace agreement has been 
concluded and Chapter VII invoked, the Council demanded the 
parties adhere to the agreement in 92% of all NIACs.188 
Imposing an obligation not to resolve internal conflicts by force 
raises the question of whether the Council is effectively articulating a 
                                               
 181. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 182. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2053, at 1 (June 27, 2012) (asking that “all armed groups” 
stop acts of violence); S.C. Res. 1872, ¶ 5 (May 26, 2009) (acting under Chapter VII, the 
Council condemned the return of hostilities that were being undertaken to frustrate the 
efforts of the Transitional Federal Government); S.C. Res. 1834, ¶ 12 (Sept. 24, 2008) 
(demanding that armed groups discontinue violence); S.C. Res. 884, ¶ 4 (Nov. 12, 
1993) (commanding the parties to desist in armed conflict); S.C. Res. 785, ¶ 3 (Oct. 
30, 1992) (rejecting any revival of hostilities and demanding an end to hostilities). 
 183. See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
 184. In Rwanda, for example, the Council demanded on June 8, 1994 that “all 
parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire[,] and immediately take 
steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control.” S.C. Res. 925, 
¶ 6 (June 8, 1994).  The genocide in Rwanda began in early April and did not fully 
end until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took Kigali on July 4.  See GÉRARD 
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS:  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 291–95 (1995).  Indeed, the 
major reason for its cessation was the RPF wresting control of territory from Hutu 
extremists.  Id. at 291–99.  Yet, Resolution 925 demanded both that “all parties” cease 
hostilities and noted “with the gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of 
genocide have occurred in Rwanda.”  S.C. Res. 925, at 1, ¶ 6 (June 8, 1994).  The 
Rwanda episode is arguably in tension with the exception for force used to halt mass 
human rights violations identified below.  See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
 185. “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”  
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1881, ¶ 8 (Aug. 6, 2009); S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 18 
(July 31, 2007); S.C. Res. 1202, ¶ 3 (Oct. 15, 1998); S.C. Res. 1016, ¶ 6 (Sept. 21, 1995). 
 186. S.C. Res. 1311, ¶ 5 (July 28, 2000). 
 187. S.C. Res. 1828, ¶ 9 (July 31, 2008). 
 188. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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set of jus ad bellum norms189—for NIACs.190  In this Section, we argue 
that the Council appears to have done so in the form of a general 
prohibition with several exceptions.  Of all Council-imposed norms 
explored in our data, this would be the most radical departure from 
existing international law.191  The canonical modern expression of the 
jus ad bellum in U.N. Charter Article 2(4) applies by its terms only to 
inter-state conflicts;192 ICJ descriptions of the jus ad bellum in customary 
law are purely statist193 and widely-accepted definitions of aggression 
from the General Assembly194 and the statute of the International 
                                               
 189. The jus ad bellum is traditionally the body of norms defining when a state may resort 
to military force.  What Are Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello?, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Jan. 
22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0. 
 190. See KIRSTI SAMUELS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:  
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 131 (2007) (advancing that Council 
practice of demanding peaceful resolution of domestic disputes “provides important 
evidence of the normative and moral views of the international community on 
recourse to force in civil conflict”).  As noted, in some cases the Council phrases its 
demand for cessation in general terms, and in others it demands that parties adhere 
to peace agreements.  One might argue that only the former contributes to an internal 
jus ad bellum because in the latter cases the Council is simply demanding the parties 
adhere to commitments they themselves have created, not those imposed by international 
law.  Note this argument assumes the peace agreements are binding, an issue discussed 
above.  See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.  If they are not binding then 
the distinction is illusory.  Even if they are binding, the Council could hardly order 
one party to adhere to the terms of a treaty that the other party had materially 
breached.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 60. 
 191. The opposing view on this issue is entirely plausible, but assessing all the 
contours of a potential internal jus ad bellum is well beyond the scope of this Article.  
See Christian Henderson & James A. Green, The Jus Ad Bellum and Entities Short of 
Statehood in the Report on the Conflict in Georgia, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 129, 133 (2010) 
(arguing that it is debatable whether the prohibition on the use of force is actually 
endorsed by the U.N. Charter). 
 192. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 193. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 148–52 (Dec. 19); Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209 (June 27) 
(finding that international customary law does not contain a general right to 
intervene); see also Legality of Use by State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 31 (July 8) (declining to issue an advisory opinion 
on states’ use of nuclear weapons to the World Health Organization). 
 194. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1974) (“Aggression is the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as set out in this Definition.” (emphasis added)). 
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Criminal Court195 speak exclusively of inter-state uses of force.  
Scholarly accounts are similarly unequivocal.196 
The state-centrism of the jus ad bellum has deep historical roots in 
nearly absolutist notions of protecting states’ autonomy to resolve 
internal disputes without external interference.197  In this view, the 
government enjoyed autonomy to put down challenges to its authority, 
and a rebel group enjoyed autonomy to mount such a challenge, 
sometimes referred to as the right to revolution.198  That a government 
oppressed its citizens and suppressed their attempts to rise in protest 
has not translated into a right of other states to intervene on behalf of 
the regime’s opponents.199  But Council practice does not reflect a 
clear distinction between limitations on the inter-state and intra-state 
uses of force.  Three aspects of Council practice have substantially 
undermined the idea of a disinterested international community 
standing aloof from NIACs.  First, the various Council sanctions 
regimes have created obligations for all states to target individuals and 
groups defying a range of Council dictates to halt fighting or adhere 
                                               
 195. Resolution RC/Res.4, Attachment I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, art. 8 bis (1) (defining the 
“crime of aggression” as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a 
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”). 
 196. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 6 (4th ed. 2005) 
(excluding intra-State conflict entirely from analysis of legality of the use of force). 
 197. See Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 704 n.56 (2016) 
(“International law professes to be concerned with the relations of states to each other.  
Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a 
civil war . . . are acts which have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such 
relations.” (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (2d ed. 1884))). 
 198. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 832–33 (7th ed. 2014); see also 
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to 
Jurisdiction:  Lomé Accord Amnesty, ¶ 20 (Mar. 13, 2004) (“There is no rule against 
rebellion in international law.”). 
 199. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 209 (June 27) (noting that there is nothing in 
international customary law to justify state intervention on behalf of an opposition in 
another state); see also Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, Humanitarian Intervention:  The 
Lessons Learned, 99 CURRENT HIST. 419, 420–21 (2000) (questioning whether 
humanitarian intervention is lawful under the U.N. Charter because most legal 
scholars argue that the U.N. Charter contains a general prohibition against 
intervention under Article 2(4)). 
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to prior peace agreements.200  The Council imposed sanctions in 73% 
of NIACs with Chapter VII and in 83% of such conflicts that began 
after 1990.201  While the specific acts triggering sanctions vary widely—
from violations of peace agreements, to refusal to cease hostilities, to 
violations of human rights—each traces its origins to resolutions 
imposing the non-use of force obligations described above.202  The 
Council has thereby enlisted the entire international community in its 
effort to coerce NIAC parties into resolving disputes peacefully. 
The second aspect of Council practice that undermines the notion 
that the international community is detached from NIACs is the 
Council’s consistent but fraught choice to seek peaceful solutions to 
conflicts in which the incentives for parties to cooperate are often quite 
low.  Studies of how NIACs end show that decisive military victories 
produce longer periods of peace than negotiated settlements.203  That 
the Council persists in a low-odds peacemaking strategy for NIACs 
suggests a commitment to intervention despite strong practical 
arguments for not doing so. 
The third aspect of Council practice indicating the international 
community’s interest in NIACs is the Council’s condemnation of 
virtually every destructive consequence of the internal use of force.  
This includes the targeting of civilians, women, and children; large-
scale internal displacements; the destruction of cultural property; the 
abuse of human rights; and acts amounting to international crimes.204  
                                               
 200. E.g., S.C. Res. 1267, at 2, ¶ 3 (Oct. 15, 1999) (demanding that all states impose 
sanctions against the Taliban because it failed to comply with the Council’s demand 
to turn over Usama bin Laden). 
 201. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 202. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
 203. Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36, 36, 44 (1999) 
(arguing that ceasefires or peace agreements are simply a break in the conflict that 
allows sides to rest and time to rearm, rather than leading to an effective peace 
solution); see Fabio Andres Diaz & Syed Mansoob Murshed, “Give War A Chance”:  All-
Out War as a Means of Ending Conflict in the Cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia, 15 CIVIL 
WARS 281, 283, 285–87 (2013) (examining data on peace agreements and return to 
conflict, specifically considering both Colombia and Sri Lanka). 
 204. See S.C. Res. 2206, at 1 (Mar. 3, 2015) (condemning the large-scale 
displacement of civilians in South Sudan conflict); S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 17 (Feb. 12, 2015) 
(demanding an end to the continued destruction of cultural property in Iraq and 
Syria); S.C. Res. 1894, at 1 (Nov. 11, 2009) (expressing regret for the targeting of 
civilians in armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1612, at 1 (July 26, 2005) (recognizing the rights 
of children in all armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1355, at 1 (June 15, 2001) (noting the 
concern for human rights violations and atrocities against civilians in the DR Congo); 
S.C. Res. 1325, at 2 (Oct. 31, 2000) (recognizing the importance of women’s and girls’ 
rights in all armed conflicts); S.C. Res. 1231, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 1998) (calling on 
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The marginal difference in intrusion on state autonomy between these 
interventions and an appropriately limited internal jus ad bellum hardly 
matches an absolutist view that internal uses of force are wholly beyond 
international regulation.205 
B. The Nature of an Internal Jus Ad Bellum in Council Practice 
If the Council now treats the fact of NIACs as an issue of legitimate 
international concern and views an immediate end to hostilities as its 
preeminent objective, then have its views coalesced into discernable 
norms?  The few scholars who have explored a jus ad bellum regime for 
NIACs have not placed particular emphasis on Council practice.  Kjell 
Anderson grounds the idea in an individual right to peace.206  Eliav 
Lieblich proposes a norm extrapolated from the human right to life.207  
Timothy Waters proposes a more limited focus on “protectable 
territory” within a state, intervention into which would trigger an 
international law violation.208 
Exploring all the contours of a fully-developed internal jus ad bellum 
is well beyond the scope of this Article.  Given the embryonic state of 
the law in this area, any suggested norm would need to be a modest 
one.  Thus, we follow the inter-state jus ad bellum by identifying the 
general prohibition on force that it creates, augmented by several 
exceptions.  The breadth of the rule’s exceptions recognizes its 
revolutionary nature.  Three exceptions are suggested by commentators 
and grounded in Council practice, while a fourth is the Council’s alone. 
                                               
perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone NIAC 
to be brought to justice). 
 205. This claim is not an effort to collapse the jus ad bellum/jus in bello distinction.  
The cited condemnations by the Council all fit formally or notionally within the jus in 
bello.  But the state autonomy claim does not map clearly on to this distinction.  Its 
broad invocation of a zone of domestic discretion appears rather hollow if it asserts 
only a right to resort to internal force but not the right to use that force in the way 
domestic actors see fit. 
 206. See Kjell Anderson, The Universality of War:  Jus ad Bellum and the Right to Peace 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 52, 52 (David Keane & Yvonne McDermott eds., 2012). 
 207. Lieblich, supra note 197, at 743. 
 208. Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little Russia:  Misreading the Georgian War 
Through the Distorting Lens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 176, 229 (2013) (proposing 
a norm that would focus on “identifying territorial lines with a functional status equal 
to an international frontier in relation to the use of force—territory whose violation 
would allow the kinds of responses that are automatically available in true international 
conflicts.  This would create, within a single state, differentiated sovereignties derived 
directly from the territorial aspects of conflict”). 
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1. Self-defense exception 
The first exception is for force used in self-defense, paralleling the 
interstate jus ad bellum.209  Either a governmental or a non-
governmental actor could use force in response to a prior use of force 
against its members.210  In Afghanistan, for example, after expressing 
“its concern about the security situation . . . , in particular the 
increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban [and] Al-
Qaida,” the Council called upon the Afghan government “to address 
the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the 
Taliban [and] Al-Qaida.”211  In DR Congo, the Security Council gave 
the U.N. Organization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) 
peacekeeping force a mandate to work “in close cooperation” with the 
government—specifically with its armed forces—to protect civilians 
from attacks by armed militias, to disarm those militias, and to “disrupt 
the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use 
violence.”212  In both cases, the Council legitimated forceful responses 
to prior attacks.213 
2. Exceptions for furthering democratic legitimacy and halting mass 
violations of human rights 
But a blanket exception for self-defense would take no account of 
the reasons force had been used in the first place.  An oppressive 
                                               
 209. A minimum threshold requirement would distinguish attacks triggering a right 
of self-defense from legitimate acts of law enforcement, crowd control, or the quelling 
of civil unrest.  Elian Lieblich usefully equates this threshold with that in the inter-state 
jus ad bellum:  “resort to internal hostilities can only be undertaken in self-or-other-
defense against a prior use of force itself amounting to hostilities.”  Lieblich, supra 
note 197, at 740. 
 210. The threshold could also be described as an “armed attack” per U.N. Charter article 
51.  Additionally, the right of self-defense would be limited to responses to the first attack.  As 
is often remarked in the inter-state context, there is no self-defense to self-defense. 
 211. S.C. Res. 1806, at 2, ¶ 11 (Mar. 20, 2008); see also S.C. Res. 2041, ¶ 23 (Mar. 22, 
2012) (using similar language for Afghan conflict); S.C. Res. 1234, at 1, ¶ 4 (Apr. 4, 
1999) (expressing concern over “measures taken by forces opposing the Government 
in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and calling for “the re-
establishment of the authority of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo throughout its territory”). 
 212. S.C. Res. 1856, ¶¶ 3, 3(a), 3(f) (Dec. 22, 2008); see also S.C. Res. 2076, ¶ 3 (Nov. 
20, 2012) (condemning the attempts from the March 23 Movement “to establish an 
illegitimate parallel administration and to undermine State authority of the 
Government of the [DR Congo]”). 
 213. See S.C. Res. 1856, at 1, ¶ 3 (Dec. 22, 2008) (allowing the use of force in the 
DR Congo for the promotion of international security); S.C. Res. 1806, ¶¶ 3, 4 (Mar. 
20, 2008) (authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan to protect its civilians). 
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government attacked by a pro-democratic insurgency and a genocidal 
insurgency attacked by a democratic government would be equally 
entitled to respond to attacks with force.  Ignoring the equities involved 
in such conflicts would effectively replicate international law’s traditional 
abnegation of interest in NIACs.214  Council practice suggests two further 
exceptions that would temper the self-defense exception to account for 
the nature and goals of the regime or rebel group involved:  the use of 
force to further democratic legitimacy215 and the use of force to resist 
mass human rights violations.216  A narrowly-drawn democratic 
legitimacy exception would apply to a regime—incumbent or ousted—
seeking to vindicate an electoral victory deemed free and fair by 
external observers, preferably from the United Nations.217 
The idea of democratic legitimacy now has deep roots in Council 
practice, as well as that of other U.N. bodies.218  The Council supported 
free and fair elections in 53% of NIACs in our data set in which 
Chapter VII was invoked.219  Twice—in Haiti in 1994 and Sierra Leone 
in 1997—the Council approved of military force to oust regimes that 
                                               
 214. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:  NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2002), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 
other/law10_final.pdf (describing how historical state practice such as disallowing 
interference in domestic affairs in conjunction with U.N. Charter article 2(7) and 
preventing U.N. intervention in internal affairs work together to elucidate 
international law’s disinterest in NIACs). 
 215. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 216. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1706, at 2, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Aug. 31, 2006) (authorizing the use of 
force in Darfur after expressing concern for the safety of humanitarian aid workers 
and the Darfur population); see also S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2011) (allowing the 
U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire to “use all necessary measures” to prevent the 
continued attacks against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire). 
 217. See SAMUELS, supra note 190, at 117–21 (detailing Council practice of rejecting 
“political violence against democratically elected governments”). 
 218. See Jean d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.& POL. 877, 887 (2006) (finding that after the Cold War, 
democracy has been viewed as the more legitimate form of government); 
Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, supra note 161, at 15 (showing 
democracy to be of importance to the Council of Europe and the Organization of 
American States); Fox, Right to Political Participation, supra note 161, at 32 (contending 
that the idea of democratic entitlement began with the U.N. Charter and became a 
seemingly legitimate practice within bodies like the General Assembly); 
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, GUIDANCE NOTE ON DEMOCRACY 1 (2009), 
https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/file_att
ach/UNSG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy-EN.pdf (noting that all 
states could benefit from democracy). 
 219. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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had overthrown democratically elected leaders.220  An additional 
exception for force intended to halt mass human rights violations 
would limit claims of self-defense when used as either justification or 
cover for such violations.221  This exception would be grounded in two 
aspects of Council practice in NIACs:  its frequent condemnation of 
human rights violations222 and its authorization of the use of force—in 
whole or in part—to redress the violation of human rights.223 
3. Exception for anti-terrorism actions 
Finally, the Council has indicated support for internal uses of force 
designed to defeat terrorist groups or those affiliated with terrorists.224  
                                               
 220. See S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 1 (Oct. 8, 1997) (demanding, under Chapter VII, that “the 
military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way 
for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to 
constitutional order”); S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4 (July 31, 1994) (authorizing, under Chapter 
VII, the creation of a multilateral force “to use all necessary means to facilitate the 
departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island 
Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti”); 
see also S.C. Res. 1181, at 1 (July 13, 1998) (commending the Economic Community of 
West African States’s (ECOWAS) role in re-establishing the democratic process in 
Sierra Leone); S.C. Pres. Statement 1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that after the 
ECOWAS force deposed the Sierra Leone junta, the Council had “welcome[d] the fact 
that the rule of the military junta [had] been brought to an end”). 
 221. See JAN ARNO HESSBRUEGGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 333–34 (2017) (arguing that allowing a right to resist mass 
atrocities could limit violence for forcing those launching an attack to provide a legal 
justification for the aggression). 
 222. The Council condemned human rights violations in 71% of NIACs in which 
Chapter VII was invoked and 80% of such conflicts that started after 1990.  UN Security 
Council Data Set, supra note 13.  Peacekeeping missions were given mandates to protect 
human rights in 82% of NIACs with Chapter VII.  Id. 
 223. Examples include interventions authorized under Chapter VII in several 
countries.  See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (Libya); S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3 (Sept. 
15, 1999) (East Timor); S.C. Res. 1101, ¶ 4 (Mar. 28, 1997) (Albania); S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 
4 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 929, ¶¶ 3, 4 (June 22, 1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 
836, ¶ 8 (June 4, 1993) (Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 794, ¶¶ 7, 10 (Dec. 3, 
1992) (Somalia).  See generally Inger Österdahl, The Exception as the Rule:  Lawmaking on 
Force and Human Rights by the UN Security Council, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 1, 1–2 
(2005) (arguing that the only response that the U.N. Security Council has to every 
situation is using humanitarian intervention); George Weber, The Humanitarian and 
Human Right Duties of the United Nations Security Council, 1 U. BALT. J. INT’L L. 221, 223 
(2013) (examining how the Security Council has responded to human rights’ abuses). 
 224. In the inter-state setting, the Council has suggested, though not 
uncontroversially, that attacks by terrorist groups give rise to a right of self-defense 
whether or not the attacks can be attributed to the host state.  See S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1 
(Nov. 20, 2015) (noting that ISIL “has the capability and intention to carry out further 
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The central example is Mali, where the Council sided with an elected 
government in conflict with rebel groups in the north of the country, 
several of which the Council identified as having ties to terrorist 
organizations.225  After France intervened to assist the government in 
early January 2013, the Council welcomed “the swift action by the 
French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali, to 
stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist[,] and armed groups towards 
the south of Mali.”226  The Council thus endorsed the government’s 
use of force to defeat the terrorist-affiliated groups. 
C. Conclusions 
Council practice thus suggests a general condemnation of force used 
in NIACs with exceptions for self-defense and force used to restore 
democratically elected regimes to end mass human rights violations 
and to defeat terrorist or terrorist-affiliated groups.  Much would need 
to change in the contemporary jus ad bellum and cognate fields of 
international law for limitations on the internal use of force to take 
hold.  But the Council’s own preferences seem clear. 
V. SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE AS EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The patterns in Security Council practice we have described may be 
relevant to customary international law if the Council has a role in the 
                                               
attacks and regards all such acts of terrorism as a threat to peace and security”); 
S.C. Res. 1373, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2001) (affirming the right of self-defense in light of 
September 11 attacks); see also S.C. Res. 1368, at 1 (Sept. 12, 2001) (reiterating the 
right under the U.N. Charter of states to individual or collective self-defense); Thomas 
M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right to Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 839–40 (2001) 
(finding that the United Nations passed a resolution the day of the 9/11 attack in New 
York to demonstrate that it recognizes a right to self-defense).  But see Legal 
Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 139 (July 9) (noting that there is no right of self-defense to 
acts of terrorism by non-state actor). 
 225. See S.C. Res. 2085, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2012); see also S.C. Res. 2056, ¶ 23 (July 5, 
2012) (authorizing an African Union mission to Somalia, established under Chapter 
VII, to take “all necessary measures” to defend the fragile Transitional Federal 
Government against the Al Shabaab group); S.C. Res. 2036, at 2, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2012) 
(condemning attacks on the government “by armed opposition groups, and foreign 
fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, and stressing that Somali armed opposition groups and 
foreign fighters . . . constitute a terrorist threat to Somalia, and the international 
community” and authorizing African Union mission to take the necessary steps to 
coordinate with Somali security forces and reduce the threat posed by opposition groups). 
 226. S.C. Res. 2100, at 1 (Apr. 25, 2013); see also S.C. Res. 2227, at 3 (June 29, 2015) 
(endorsing the continued use of French forces to defeat terrorist threats in Mali). 
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creation of custom.  In this Part, we describe a theory of how the 
Council participates in customary law-making.  First, this Part describes 
the Council’s unique position in the architecture of international 
peace and security law that endows its views on armed conflict with a 
particular salience.  Second, it describes how the Council has used that 
position in practice regarding NIACs both to intervene in conflicts 
more frequently than states acting individually or in groups and to 
impose a consistent set of obligations on NIAC parties over time.  
Third, it asks how aggregated Council practice can be seen as fulfilling 
the two elements of custom traditionally required of state action:  
practice and opinion juris.  Finally, this Part addresses two common 
objections to Council resolutions that serve as evidence of custom. 
Because we view Council resolutions as evidence of customary law, we 
do not argue that resolutions themselves create custom.227  Council 
resolutions are simply one of the various forms of evidence to be 
assessed in determining the existence and content of a customary 
norm.228  The vigorous debate on the four substantive issues we discuss 
above229 results from the evidence on each issue being both diverse and 
inconclusive.  In our view, the addition of Council practice could in 
some cases affect the outcome of those debates. 
A. Acts of International Organizations as a Source of Custom 
Custom is traditionally understood as primarily emanating from the 
acts of individual states.230  But as international organizations assume 
                                               
 227. Few sources of custom create new norms on their own.  The exception would 
be so-called “instant custom,” which is quite rare.  See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative 
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 435 (1983). 
 228. In Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 6, 2006), for example, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights reviewed decisions and statutes of 
international tribunals, resolutions of the General Assembly, views of the U.N. 
Secretary-General, and resolutions of the Council to conclude that national amnesties 
for crimes against humanity are invalid.  Id. ¶¶ 105–14.  Similarly, in Tadić, the ICTY 
Appellate Body considered national military manuals, national legislation, agreements 
concluded by the ICRC, and Council resolutions (which it deemed “of great 
relevance”) to find that individual criminal responsibility could attach to violations of 
basic humanitarian law principles applicable to internal conflicts.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128–36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 229. See supra notes 209–26 (examining exceptions to the general prohibition on 
force created under the inter-state jus ad bellum). 
 230. See, e.g., ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 76 (contending that 
states form international customary laws through their practices, “or expression, of 
rules of customary international law”).  In Jurisdictional Immunities of state (Ger. v. It.; 
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an increasingly prominent role in global policymaking, the case for 
viewing their practice as evidence of custom has gained strength.231  
Broadly stated, the argument is that if international organizations are 
now understood to have the international legal personality necessary 
to perform a wide variety of functions previously reserved to states, 
there is no reason to ignore the implications for customary law that 
follow from the organizations’ exercise of that personality.232  The ICJ 
has cited General Assembly resolutions as evidence of custom on issues 
such as the permissible use of force, non-intervention, and the legality 
of the use of nuclear weapons.233  Other international tribunals have 
cited General Assembly resolutions as evidence of custom on different 
issues.234  The ILC recently accepted a version of this claim in 
                                               
Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3), the ICJ held that it is “State 
practice from which customary international law is derived.”  Id. ¶ 101. 
 231. See Jed Odermatt, The Development of Customary International Law by International 
Organizations, 66 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 491, 496 (2017) (suggesting that the concept that 
states and international organizations help form international customary law should 
not be contentious); Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 82, at 116 (recognizing that 
it has become accepted practice to allow non-governmental organizations to create 
international law).  Judge Takana was an early advocate of this position.  See South West 
Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 291 (July 18) 
(Tanaka, J., dissenting) (arguing that the traditional individualistic, statist conception 
of custom developed through repetitive actions by States will change to adapt to the 
new “parliamentary diplomacy” method of generating custom through actions of 
“organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, with their 
agencies and affiliated institutions); see also Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), 
Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, at 25 n.120, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (collecting various supportive separate opinions of ICJ 
judges opining on the creation of custom by non-governmental, international bodies). 
 232. Mathias, supra note 23, at 26 (introducing the idea that once the ICJ has noted 
that international organizations have distinct characteristics and rights, the ILC might 
also determine whether they have an effect on customary international law). 
 233. See Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 162 (Dec. 19); Legality of Use by State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 1 (July 8) (asking the 
court for an opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons is acceptable); Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary 
International Law:  An Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 576 (2016) 
(noting the “widely-held view that U.N. General Assembly resolutions are evidence of 
customary international law”). 
 234. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past?  Modern Tribunals 
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 475 (1991) (reviewing 
arbitral decisions on the standard for expropriated property that rely heavily on 
General Assembly resolutions). 
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provisional “conclusions” on the identification of customary law.235  
The ILC position is hesitant but supportive, acknowledging that in 
“certain cases, the practice of international organizations also 
contributes to [custom].”236  The Commission elaborates that while a 
resolution of an international organization “cannot, of itself, create a 
rule of customary international law[,] . . . [a] resolution adopted by an 
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may 
provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule 
of customary international law, or contribute to its development.”237 
The ILC does not apply this general assessment—which we accept—
to the Council.238  Instead, in keeping with much contemporary 
scholarship, it focuses almost exclusively on resolutions of the General 
Assembly.239  This Section argues that such a limited focus is 
unwarranted and that both the Council’s legal status and its extensive 
history of addressing NIACs should bring its resolutions within the 
ambit of the ILC’s general willingness to treat international 
organization practice as evidence of custom. 
It is first useful to understand how patterns of Council-imposed 
obligations compare to General Assembly resolutions as evidence of 
custom, since the latter are now well-accepted.240  One important factor 
used in assessing the normative value of General Assembly 
                                               
 235. See ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 75–76. (noting that the 
ILC’s adoption of conclusions evidencing international organizations’ contributions 
to custom “proved to be quite controversial” within the ILC); Michael Wood, 
International Organizations and Customary International Law, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
609, 616 (2015) (referencing the ILC’s controversial discussion on inclusion of 
international organizations as contributors to custom). 
 236. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 76; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, 
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 194 (8th ed. 2012) (noting that 
the practice of the Council and General Assembly “may have considerable legal 
significance”); Niels Blokker, International Organizations and Customary International 
Law:  Is the International Law Commission Taking International Organizations Seriously?, 
14 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (noticing that the ILC considered international 
organizations’ behavior when drafting general rules). 
 237. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 78. 
 238. In his Third Report, Michael Wood, the Special Rapporteur, mentions the 
Council as an example of an international organization organ “with more limited 
membership” whose resolutions “will generally have less weight in evidencing general 
customary international law; they may, however, have a central role in the formation 
and identification of particular custom.”  Wood, Third Report, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
 239. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 107 (noting that General 
Assembly resolutions are important to analyze because they reflect the state members’ 
opinions). 
 240. See Helfer & Wuerth, supra note 233, at 576 (noting that it is a well-accepted 
idea that General Assembly resolutions contribute to international customary law). 
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resolutions—repetition over time—finds clear resonance in the 
patterns of Council-imposed obligations in our data.241  But in other 
respects, Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions differ.  
First and most obviously, Council resolutions are binding and General 
Assembly resolutions are not.242  Second, General Assembly resolutions 
may accurately reflect the views of all U.N. member states if all choose 
to vote or a resolution is adopted by consensus while Council 
resolutions come from an elite body of limited membership.243  Third, 
the General Assembly resolutions usually cited as evidence of custom 
are structured as treaty-like documents that describe a series of rights 
and obligations phrased as rules of general application.244  A 
prominent example is the 1974 Definition of Aggression, relied upon 
in the Nicaragua case, which provides a detailed elaboration of when 
a state’s unilateral use of force is unlawful.245  By contrast, the Council 
                                               
 241. See Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 70 (8 July) (suggesting that several similar and consecutive resolutions 
might demonstrate the development of the “opinio juris” needed to solidify a new rule); 
id. ¶ 73 (noting that “the adoption each year by the General Assembly, by a large 
majority, of resolutions” on issues in nascent customary norm); see also UN Security 
Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 242. See U.N. Charter art. 10. (describing General Assembly resolutions as 
“recommendations”). 
 243. James A. Paul, Security Council Reform:  Arguments About the Future of the United 
Nations System, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Feb. 6, 1995), https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-
council/security-council-reform/41128-veto-analysis.html (noting criticism of the 
Council as an “elite group”). 
 244. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 1 (Dec. 
14, 1974); DINSTEIN, supra note 196, at 126 (calling the General Assembly’s definition 
of aggression “the most widely (albeit not universally) accepted” definition (citation 
omitted)).  Many other resolutions containing broad conventions or directives have 
this similar treaty-style formatting of listing rights as generally applicable rules.  E.g., 
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, ch. 1 (Dec. 
12, 1974) (demanding that States “shall” be governed by certain economic principles); 
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nation, ¶ 1 (Oct. 24, 1970) (approving of a Declaration on Principles of 
International Law); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1962) (declaring that people have a right to sovereignty over 
their natural resources); G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1960) (using 
preambular language to establish the right of individuals to dispose of their own 
resources or wealth without prejudice); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, preamble (Dec. 10, 1948) (imposing as a rule in its preamble the 
right of all individuals to their inherent dignity). 
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resolutions in the data set are case-specific, describing only obligations 
related to particular conflicts.246  This difference may be understood as 
affecting the opinio juris value of the documents:  the General Assembly 
resolutions are assumed to be intended to affect customary law, while 
no such assumption is made about the case-specific Council 
resolutions.  In sum, the resolutions most commonly-discussed 
characteristics point in different directions:  the first two support a 
normative role for Council resolutions while second two do not. 
B. Council Attributes Supporting a Role in Creating Evidence of Custom 
But noting these differences should not end the discussion.  The 
Council has its own positive attributes, not shared by the General 
Assembly, that support treating its consistent practice as evidence of 
custom.  The following Sections examine these attributes, which fall 
into two broad categories:  the unique structural role of the Council as 
the premier international body addressing armed conflict, including 
NIACs, and the Council’s consistent practice of imposing similar 
obligations in virtually all contemporary NIACs. 
1. The Council’s unique role in peace and security law 
Treating Council resolutions as evidence of customary law is, first 
and foremost, a function of the Council’s role in the law of international 
peace and security.247  To ignore or marginalize Council practice, treating 
it as no more important than or, potentially, less important than state 
practice, would be inconsistent with the central role in conflict 
mitigation that states have already assigned to the Council. 
a. Authority to legitimize or condemn uses of force 
First, the Council has the unique authority to legitimize or condemn 
uses of force by states.  Inter-state uses of force that might otherwise 
not qualify as self-defense—the sole justification for unilateral action 
found in the Charter—may be rendered lawful by Council approval;248 
instances of humanitarian intervention are prominent examples.249  
                                               
 246. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 247. See Öberg, supra note 24, at 897 (indicating that the United Nations creates 
customary international law and does not simply interpret or restate it). 
 248. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize 
the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 530 (2005) (explaining the Council’s expansive 
interpretation of its authority to legitimize and delegitimize state uses of force and 
asserting that the authority lies in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). 
 249. See RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY:  FROM 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 226 (2d ed. 2017) (describing 
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Similarly, interventions that might otherwise have colorable claims to 
legality can be authoritatively deemed unlawful by Council 
condemnation.250  The Council’s dominant posture vis-à-vis states is 
made most vivid by its ability to terminate otherwise lawful acts of self-
defense when it takes “measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.”251  No state or group of states could lawfully 
assume any of these Council powers.252 
b. Binding state and non-state actors 
Second, the Council has unique authority to bind those it addresses 
in its resolutions.  Any normative consequences of Council action rely, 
at their core, on the Council’s ability to bind the specific actors it seeks 
to influence.253  This power to bind is grounded in a series of inter-
locking Charter powers.  Under Articles 24(1) and 25, U.N. member 
states authorize the Council to act on their behalf when addressing 
peace and security issues and agree to accept and carry out the 
Council’s decisions.254  Chapter VII of the Charter allows the Council 
to employ forceful measures to address breaches of peace and security 
regardless of whether the issue would otherwise fall within a state’s 
                                               
the movement to outlaw humanitarian intervention without U.N. approval).  See 
generally Fernando R. Tesón, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
323, 343–68 (1996) (detailing situations in which the Council allowed use of force for 
collective humanitarian intervention, including in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia). 
 250. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force:  The U.N’s 
Response to Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 453 (1991) (detailing how the 
Council immediately condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). 
 251. U.N. Charter art. 51.  Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel long ago observed that 
the record of the Charter’s drafting “is entirely inconsistent with the notion that, once 
the Security Council has taken measures, individual members are supposed to remain 
free to design their own military responses.”  Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN 
Police Action in Lieu of War: “The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 65 (1991). 
 252. DINSTEIN, supra note 196, at 283 (noting states’ limited right of self-defense under 
the U.N. Charter stand in contrast to Council’s near unlimited authority to respond with 
force to any form of aggression, even if it does not amount to an armed attack). 
 253. Of course, the Council may choose to issue non-binding resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the Charter that impose no legal obligations.  Efforts to resolve some 
conflicts, such as Kashmir, are composed entirely of non-binding recommendations.  
See Brian R. Farrell, The Security Council and Kashmir, 22 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 343, 357 (2013) (stating that the Council declined to bind Pakistan or India in 
its resolutions on the Kashmir, instead calling on the states to find peaceful 
resolutions). 
 254. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.  Article 25 provides:  “The Members of the United 
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.”  U.N. Charter art. 25. 
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domestic jurisdiction.255  The obligatory character of these measures is 
not affected by conflicting obligations imposed by other treaties, as 
Charter obligations are specifically accorded priority.256 
Council obligations relating to NIACs are addressed to three classes 
of actors:  (i) state parties to a conflict; (ii) non-state parties to a 
conflict; and (iii) states in the broader international community.257  
While the first and third categories are innovative in the issues they 
address, these obligations adhere to the traditionally statist conception 
of Council authority.  That Council “decisions” under Article 25 and 
particularly those enacted under Chapter VII are binding on member 
states—now every state in the world—is uncontroversial.258  Indeed, the 
critical pushback that accompanied the Council’s rapid expansion of 
its jurisdiction after the end of the Cold War was premised on the 
perceived danger of an unaccountable Council imposing binding 
                                               
 255. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7, arts. 39–42.  The obligation to accept and adhere to 
Council decisions is repeated in Article 48 with specific regard to actions under 
Chapter VII.  U.N. Charter art. 48. 
 256. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, ¶ 331, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (explaining that 
Article 103 of the Charter does not clearly define the primacy of Security Council 
decisions, but this primacy “has been widely accepted in practice as well as in 
doctrine”); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United Kingdom) and 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), in 2 MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, WORLD COURT DIGEST, at 417, 418 (1997) [hereinafter Questions 
of Interpretation] (“[I]n accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of 
the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international 
agreement . . . .”). 
 257. See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning violations by Syrian 
government and non-state armed organizations); S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 20 (Sept. 27, 2013) 
(directing the general international community to prevent those in the Syrian conflict 
from procuring chemical weapons); S.C. Res. 1577, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (considering 
appropriate measures for non-state actors party to the conflict in Burundi). 
 258. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 112 (June 21); Question of Interpretation, 
supra note 256, at 418 (explaining the Council resolutions that bound the Libyan 
government to take specific actions); 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:  A 
COMMENTARY 790, 795  (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER] (describing how the binding nature of Council 
decisions is derived from the language in Article 25). 
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obligations on weaker states.259  The binding nature of those 
resolutions, in other words, was assumed even by the Council’s critics. 
Since many of the normative patterns identified in the data set 
involve the second category,260 the Council’s capacity to bind non-state 
actors requires a more extensive discussion.  The Council often 
regulates non-state actors indirectly by obligating states to take action 
against non-state groups and individuals.261  The clearest examples are 
the various smart-sanctions regimes, which enlist national laws and 
institutions to penalize individuals through travel bans, asset freezes, 
and other measures under Chapter VII.262  One could well argue that 
because these sanctions are triggered by and designed to reverse acts 
of non-state entities, the indirect nature of the punitive measures is not 
a meaningful distinction from direct measures.  But the Council has 
also addressed non-state actors directly without the mediating 
presence of states.263  One example is secessionist entities, which the 
                                               
 259. See generally Maurizio Arcari, Limits to Security Council Powers Under UN the Charter 
and Issues of Charter Interpretation, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 239, 239 (2012) (discussing 
the varied approaches to interpreting the Council’s power and the worry that it is 
extending beyond its permissible boundaries). 
 260. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 261. See COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER, supra note 258, at 800–01; see also Enrico 
Carisch & Loraine Rickard-Martin, Implementation of United Nations Targeted Sanctions, 
in TARGETED SANCTIONS:  THE IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS 
150, 150  (Biersteker et al. eds., 2016) (arguing that while effective implementation rests 
on states, U.N. bodies such as the Secretariat also have implementation responsibilities). 
 262. See Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen, Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed 
Conflicts:  First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda, 91 INT’L AFF. 1387, 1388 (2015) 
(identifying twenty-seven Council-created sanctions regimes since the end of the Cold 
War that “target individuals, groups, companies, regimes[,] and products, for example 
by means of financial sanctions, travel bans, commodity trade restrictions and sectoral 
economic means”).  Another prominent example is resolutions requiring states to take 
various actions against terrorist groups.  Resolutions, SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-
TERRORISM COMMITTEE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (providing a list of the Council’s Counter-Terrorism resolutions).  
See generally Boon, supra note 70, at 560–61 (examining the Sanctions Committees’ 
duties as investigators and decision makers determining when violations occurred and 
which actors should be included in sanctions regimes). 
 263. See NON STATE ACTORS, supra note 87, at 6–7 (2014) (noting that the Council 
has called on non-state actors to respect human right obligations); Jan Klabbers, (I 
Can’t Get No) Recognition:  Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC 
COSMOPOLITANISM:  ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354–
55 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (arguing that there must be a justification 
for placing international obligations on non-state actors); Kooijmans, supra note 82, at 
333; Pini Pavel Miretski, Delegitimizing or Evolving?  The Legality of UN Security 
Council Resolutions Imposing Duties on Non-State Actors 2 (Nov. 25, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19
2018] NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 701 
Council periodically addresses independently of their parent states.264  
Another example is political candidates or parties who defy the results 
of democratic elections.265  Of more relevance to this study, the 
Council has frequently demanded that armed opposition groups 
refrain from a variety of actions during or in the aftermath of NIACs, 
such as breaching peace accords, violating human rights, or 
transgressing humanitarian law.266  Cases where the Council has made 
demands of armed opposition groups are wide-ranging and include 
the former Yugoslavia,267 Cambodia,268 Afghanistan,269 the DR 
                                               
63689 (stating that the Council has passed resolutions which create duties for non-
state actors). 
 264. See S.C. Res. 942, at 2 (Sept. 23, 1994) (imposing sanctions on “those areas of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces”); 
S.C. Res. 216, ¶ 1  (Nov. 12, 1965) (condemning “the unilateral declaration of 
independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia”); S.C. Res. 169, ¶¶ 1, 3  
(Nov. 24, 1961) (addressing attempted Katangese secession from Congo, Council 
insists “that such [secessionist] activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all 
concerned to desist therefrom”); S.C. Res. 50, ¶ 1 (May 29, 1948) (addressing “all 
Governments and authorities concerned” on question of Palestine). 
 265. See S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 1 (Mar. 30, 2011) (Côte d’Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1132, at 1 (Oct. 
8, 1997) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 841, at 2 (June 16, 1993) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 804, at 2 
(Jan. 29, 1993) (Angola). 
 266. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2113, at 4 (July 30, 2013) (condemning the human rights and 
humanitarian law violations occurring in Sudan); S.C. Res. 2098, at 2 (Mar. 28, 2013) 
(expressing concern over the transgressions of human rights and humanitarian law in 
DR Congo); S.C. Res. 1964, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2010) (condemning human rights violations 
occurring in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (demanding that all groups 
in Sudan comply with their international human rights and humanitarian law 
obligations); S.C. Res. 1577, at 2, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (considering appropriate measures 
for armed organization responsible for human rights violations in Burundi); S.C. Res. 
1509, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19, 2003) (demanding parties in Liberia fulfill their obligations under 
the peace and ceasefire agreements). 
 267. S.C. Res. 752, ¶ 1 (May 15, 1992) (demanding “that all parties and others 
concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, [and] respect 
immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992”). 
 268. S.C. Res. 792, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 1992) (demanding “that the PDK fulfil immediately 
its obligations under the Paris Agreements”). 
 269. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998) (demanding that “Afghan factions put an 
end to discrimination against girls and women and other violations of human rights”). 
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Congo,270 Angola,271 the Central African Republic,272 and Syria.273  
Council demands for “parties” or “all parties” to NIACs to cease 
unlawful acts or abjure violence have become almost routine.274  The 
ICJ has all but acknowledged the Council’s authority to impose legal 
obligations directly on non-state entities.  In the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion, the ICJ observed that “it has not been uncommon for the 
Security Council to make demands on actors other than U.N. member 
                                               
 270. S.C. Res. 1417, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2002) (reiterating that the Council “holds the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma, as the de facto authority, 
responsible to bring to an end all extrajudicial executions, human rights violations[,] 
and arbitrary harassment of civilians in Kisangani”). 
 271. S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 4 (July 15, 1993) (demanding that “UNITA accept 
unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the 
‘Acordos de Paz’”). 
 272. S.C. Res. 2121, ¶ 15 (Oct. 10, 2013) (demanding “that all armed groups, in 
particular Seleka elements[,] prevent the recruitment and use of children”). 
 273. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning “the widespread violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as 
the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed 
groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as all grave 
violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable 
international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on 
schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment[,] and 
use as human shields”). 
 274. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2109, ¶ 14 (July 11, 2013) (demanding “that all parties 
immediately cease all forms of violence and human rights violations and abuses against 
the civilian population in South Sudan”); S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013) 
(condemning a multitude of armed groups in the DR Congo and “all other armed 
groups and their continuing violence and abuses of human rights”); S.C. Res. 1861, 
¶ 20 (Jan. 14, 2009) (demanding all parties to conflicts in Chad and Central African 
Republic cease hostilities); S.C. Res. 1553, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2004) (condemning “all acts of 
violence,” and expressing “great concern” about continued violations of the 
withdrawal line in Lebanon); S.C. Res. 925, ¶ 6 (June 8, 1994) (demanding “that all 
parties to the conflict  . . . agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an 
end to systematic killings in areas under their control” in Rwanda).  The Council has 
also used such all-encompassing language to address non-state parties in its thematic 
resolutions on particularly vulnerable groups in armed conflict.  In Resolution 1894 
on civilians in armed conflict, for example, the Council demanded that “parties to 
armed conflict comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under 
international humanitarian, human rights[,] and refugee law, as well as to implement 
all relevant decisions of the Security Council.”  S.C. Res. 1894, ¶ 1 (Nov. 11, 2009); see 
also S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 1 (July 26, 2005) (condemning “the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers by parties to armed conflict”); S.C. Res. 1502, at ¶ 3 (Aug. 26, 2003) (affirming 
the “obligation of all parties involved in an armed conflict to comply fully with the 
rules and principles of international law applicable to them related to the protection 
of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel”); 
S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 9 (Oct. 31, 2000) (providing similar obligations for “all parties” 
regarding women in armed conflict). 
2018] NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 703 
states and inter-governmental organizations.”275  Because the Court 
found that the resolution at issue did not contain such demands, it had 
no occasion to rule on their binding quality.276  But, the opinion 
recognized “the possibility that non-state actors can be bound by 
obligations demanded of them by the Security Council.”277 
An increase in Council engagement with non-state actors appears 
inevitable because most conflicts it now addresses are NIACs.278  Eighty-
seven percent (46/53) of the conflicts in the data set are NIACs.279  The 
Council would quickly relegate itself to irrelevance if it was unable or 
unwilling to address at least one of the parties to every NIAC.  Take the 
conflict in the DR Congo, where much of the country has lacked state 
authority for almost two decades.280  In the eastern provinces where 
fighting has been concentrated, “[m]ore than 30 illegal armed groups 
operate . . . , fighting over territory, exploiting their natural 
resources[,] and committing atrocity crimes against civilians.”281  When 
the Council created a novel “intervention brigade” in March 2013 to 
address this security vacuum, it listed seven armed groups by name and 
demanded that they “cease immediately all forms of violence and 
                                               
 275. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 402, ¶ 116 (July 22). 
 276. Id. ¶ 115. 
 277. Gleider I. Hernández, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of the International Court 
of Justice, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 140, 
145 (highlighting that the court did not close the door on Council placing binding 
obligations on non-state actors); see Accordance with International Law of Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 117 (establishing that 
the court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the Council intended to bind 
state or non-state actors). 
 278. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995) (“[T]he practice of the Security Council is rich with cases of civil war or 
internal strife which it classified as a ‘threat to the peace’ and dealt with under 
Chapter VII . . . .”). 
 279. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 280. See KOEN VLASSENROOT, ARMED GROUPS AND MILITIAS IN EASTERN DR CONGO 3–
4 (2008), https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:610652/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
(explaining that the government has been filled with private individuals seeking 
economic gain since the 1990s). 
 281. Touko Piiparinen, Intervening to Strengthen Sovereignty:  The Lessons of the UN 
Intervention Brigade for Global Peacekeeping, 30 INT’L REL. 154, 157 (2016); see also U.N. 
Secretary-General, Special Rep. on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Great Lakes Region, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. S/2013/119 (Feb. 27, 2013) (detailing the duties 
of the intervention brigade which include dismantling armed groups and creating a 
conducive environment for the return of a State authority). 
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destabilizing activities and that their members immediately and 
permanently disband and lay down their arms.”282 
This felt need to address the realities of contemporary armed 
conflict is surely the most obvious explanation for the Council 
expanding its reach beyond state actors.  Employing such a result-
oriented pragmatism as a legal justification is appropriate for a body 
given a deliberately open-ended mandate for the “maintenance of 
international peace and security.”283  In the Reparations for Injuries 
case,284 the ICJ relied heavily on such pragmatic justifications, 
instructing that the powers of an international organization are to be 
understood both by whether they are “necessitated by the discharge of 
its functions” and how they have “developed in practice.”285 
c. Authority to intervene in internal matters such as NIACs 
Third, the Council has the authority to intervene in states’ internal 
affairs.  Because states traditionally regarded NIACs as essentially 
domestic affairs—struggles for political control within sovereign 
                                               
 282. S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013). 
 283. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1; see Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 32.  Council history has 
been marked by a series of innovative and adaptive measures, ranging from “all 
necessary means” authorizations to national forces, to the vast expansion of its 
jurisdiction, to peacekeeping, to targeted sanctions, to the creation of criminal 
tribunals.  This constant evolution is in keeping with the goal of the Charter’s drafters 
“to reserve for the Security Council the maximum possible decision-making flexibility” 
so that it could “respond to a theoretically unlimited range of possible threats at a time 
and in a manner of its choosing.”  Edward C. Luck, A Council for All Seasons:  The Creation 
of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND WAR:  THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 61, 62–63 
(Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008). 
 284. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11). 
 285. Id. at 180.  The Court later accorded an organization’s own determination that 
certain powers were necessary to discharge its function as a presumption of legality.  
Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20) 
(“[W]hen [an] Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”).  The ICTR Trial 
Chamber invoked a similar pragmatism in rejecting a challenge to the Council’s ability 
to create a court with criminal jurisdiction over individuals: 
[T]he Security Council provided an important innovation of international 
law, but there is nothing in the Defence Counsel’s motion to suggest that this 
extension of the applicability of international law against individuals was not 
justified or called for by the circumstances, notably the seriousness, the 
magnitude[,] and the gravity of the crimes committed during the conflict. 
Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defense Motion on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 35 (July 18, 1997) (emphasis added). 
2018] NEW EVIDENCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 705 
communities into which outsiders have no business intruding286—the 
Council’s ability to overcome such claims of exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction starkly distinguish its powers from that of states acting 
unilaterally.  Whereas international law prohibits individual states from 
intervening in NIACs against the wishes of the incumbent government, 
the Charter is now understood to authorize the Council to do so.287  
The Council’s views on legal issues in NIACs thus result from a body of 
practice in which individual states could not fully engage.288 
d. The Council as agent for U.N. member states 
The fourth attribute of Council authority that supports use of its 
practice as evidence of customary law is its status as an agent for the 
U.N. membership at large.  The Council is frequently described as an 
unrepresentative elite body that pursues policies at odds with the views 
of some or many other U.N. member states.289  If true, this claim would 
create a dilemma for our assessment of custom because the Council 
would use its unique powers to speak authoritatively on issues of armed 
conflict based on the views of a very small number of states.  The claim 
of Council unrepresentativeness requires an understanding of the 
relation between Council resolutions and U.N. member states more 
generally.  This Article argues for a view that attributes Council-
imposed obligations to the entire U.N. membership. 
                                               
 286. See Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict:  Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 
91 INT’L L. STUD. 60, 88 (2015) (discussing how States have been reluctant to use 
international law as a method to regulate civil wars due to a reluctance to grant any 
legitimacy to the non-state armed organizations). 
 287. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” (emphasis added)), with Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 246 (June 27) (noting I.C.J.’s argument that the principle of non-
intervention in international law would be destroyed if the opposition to the state’s 
government could also request international intervention). 
 288. Council and state practice would overlap where incumbent governments 
consent to external involvement. 
 289. See Barbara Crossette, At the U.N., a Drive for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/24/world/at-the-un-a-drive-for-
diversity.html. 
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2. The Council’s relation to U.N. member states 
Three approaches to Council-imposed obligations are possible: 
(i) as autonomous acts of the organization; (ii) as acts of Council 
member states individually; or (iii) as acts of the organization as an 
agent of its member states.  The first view fully disengages Council 
resolutions from member states and considers the states as separate 
legal entities.  While such a view may accurately describe other 
international organizations, it is inconsistent with the Charter’s 
description of the Council as an agent for member states.290  The 
second and opposite approach would view Council resolutions as the 
individual practice of its fifteen voting states, five of which are 
                                               
 290. This approach found little support in the ILC, however.  “[W]hat matters” 
about resolutions of international organization organs, the Commission stated in 
commentary, “is that they may reflect the collective expression of the views of States 
members of such organs.”  ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 107 
(emphasis added); see Odermatt, supra note 231, at 493 (the ILC “sees States as the 
driving force in international law-making, and the capacity of international 
organizations to contribute to the development of international law is reduced to their 
role in expressing the will of States”). 
The Commission describes one instance in which an international organization 
would act wholly on its own legal authority:  “where member States have transferred 
exclusive competences to the international organization.”  ILC Draft Conclusions on 
Custom, supra note 5, at 89.  The Commission gives the European Union as the sole 
example of such a transfer.  Id.; see also Wood, Third Report, supra note 5, at 53 
(referencing only the EU as an example of an international organization with exclusive 
competentences).  While the ILC does not elaborate on the nature of “exclusive 
competences,” it appears to describe a state fully abrogating its capacity to act in a 
particular area of international relations.  As an EU representative told the GA’s Sixth 
Committee, “in areas where, according to the rules of the EU Treaties, only the Union 
can act it is the practice of the Union that should be taken into account with regard to 
the formation of customary international law.”  EU Statement—United Nation 6th 
Commission:  Identification of Customary International Law, EUR. UNION DELEGATION TO 
UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 3, 2014), http://eu-un.europa.eu/eu-statement-united-nation-
6th-commission-identification-of-customary-international-law; see Wood, Third Report, 
supra note 5, at 53 n.184 (referencing this statement favorably). 
The Security Council certainly does not enjoy exclusive competence in the sense 
that member states have ceded to it all their capacity to act in specific areas, but one 
could argue that states have given the Council exclusive authority in a narrower sense:  
by agreeing to abide by its decisions on specific conflicts.  These decisions are not, as 
in the case of the EU, confined to discrete areas of policy-making.  The Council’s broad 
mandate to maintain international peace and security is virtually open-ended.  But 
once the Council has taken a decision within its competence, member states do not 
retain the ability to act contrary to its dictates. 
The Council can thus be understood as possessing an exclusive competence when 
it displaces states’ freedom of action in specific instances.  In those cases, Council 
resolutions could generate evidence of custom on its own behalf assuming the 
resolutions otherwise embody sufficient practice and opinion juris. 
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permanent members and ten of which are non-permanent 
members.291  From 1990 to 2013, ninety-five states have been members 
of the Security Council, representing significant state practice if one 
were to remove the Council entirely from the picture.292  While this 
approach hews most closely to the traditionally state-centric nature of 
customary law, it does not account for the unique institutional setting 
in which the votes take place:  within a body of power that substantially 
exceeds that of states acting unilaterally.293  Moreover, Council action 
has significance for custom precisely because its interventions in 
NIACs now substantially exceed those of individual states.294  Any 
theory of the resolutions’ provenance must consider states’ evident 
choice of the Council as their primary vehicle for addressing NIACs. 
3. Agency theory 
This leaves the third approach to Council-imposed obligations:  
agency theory.  Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that member 
states “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts 
on their behalf.”295  We understand Article 24 to create an agency 
relationship between member states and the Council:  “members, who 
have ‘delegated’ parts of their sovereignty, remain the source of 
authority of the Council [meaning] that the States, being the trust 
givers, are in consequence also the principals.”296  Under this view, 
                                               
 291. See Current Members, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 
members (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 292. See Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (listing all 
countries elected to the Council at least once since 1946). 
 293. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  The data set did not tabulate votes on 
Security Council resolutions, which might count against state practice if a member 
voted against a particular resolution. 
 294. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 295. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 296. COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER, supra note 258, at 775 (summarizing agency 
theory argument).  Compare id. at 776 (arguing that the language of the Charter 
highlights that the Council is supposed to act in the best interest of all members, but 
the acts are imputable to the entire organization), and HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 280 (1950) 
(arguing that the Council acts not on behalf of the members, but on behalf of the 
entire United Nations), with Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 544 n.61 (1993) (noting that the Council’s authority illustrates 
the members’ willingness to delegate authority). 
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Council practice is ultimately the practice of member states.297  While 
the ICJ has only hinted at support of the agency theory,298 some 
member states made the agency argument directly early in U.N. 
history.299  More recently, many non-permanent members have cited 
Article 24(1) in calling for greater transparency in Council 
procedures, arguing that if the Council acts on their behalf they should 
have greater input into its deliberations.300  Their claim, in essence, is 
                                               
 297. See BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 182 (2010) (finding Council “actions provide some evidence 
of the views of U.N. member states—Council members directly, and all members 
indirectly”). 
 298. In its 1971 Namibia decision, the Court seemed to side with the agency view 
but did not pronounce squarely on the question: 
It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once such a 
declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the 
Charter, on behalf of all member States, those Members would be free to act 
in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting 
from it.  When confronted with such an internationally unlawful situation, 
Members of the United Nations would be expected to act in consequence of 
the declaration made on their behalf. 
Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 112 (June 21) (emphasis added). 
 299. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 472nd mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.472 (May 24, 1950) 
(statement of Ecuador) (noting that “it must be remembered that every member of 
the Council, under the Charter, acts not only as a representative of his country, but as 
a representative of all States Members of the United Nations.  That particular 
responsibility is assumed by all members of the Council”); U.N. SCOR, 310th mtg. at 
24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.310 (May 29, 1948) (statement of Syria) (stating that “each 
representative on the Security Council has two duties:  one is to represent and present 
the views of his Government; the other is to represent the fifty-eight Members of the 
United Nations and to speak on their behalf.  Article 24 of the Charter states that the 
Security Council should act on behalf of all the Member States”); U.N. SCOR, 59th 
mtg. at 176, U.N. Doc. S/PV.59 (Sept. 3, 1946) (statement of United States) 
(approving the view that “the Security Council does not represent individually only the 
States which have representatives on the Council, but represents all fifty-one United 
Nations.  It is their agent for carrying out the purposes of the Charter, and such 
directions as the United Nations may give it under the Charter”); U.N. SCOR, 40th 
mtg. at 249, U.N. Doc. S/PV.40 (May 8, 1946) (statement of Australia) (“Our 
interpretation of the Charter is that each member of this Council, whether permanent 
or non-permanent, acts in a representative capacity that extends beyond the 
representation of his own Government.  He is acting on behalf of all the Members of 
the United Nations.”). 
 300. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 7539th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7539 (Oct. 20, 2015) 
(statement of Niger) (stating that Article 24 clearly requires the Council to act for all 
Members); U.N. SCOR, 7285th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7285 (Oct. 23, 2014) 
(statement of St. Lucia) (arguing that all Members have an equal stake the Council’s 
functions because it acts on behalf of all Members); U.N. SCOR 7052nd, mtg. at 27–
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that, as principals, they must be able to communicate their views to 
their agent fully and effectively. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone relied on the agency theory in 
rejecting Liberian President Charles Taylor’s claim for Head-of-State 
immunity.301  The question in the Taylor case was whether the Special 
Court constituted one of the “international tribunals” to which the ICJ 
had referred in the Arrest Warrant case as capable prosecuting heads of 
state unconstrained by immunity doctrines.302  In deciding that it was 
such an international tribunal, the Special Court focused on the 
agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations establishing 
the Court and on the Security Council’s authorization for that 
agreement in Resolution 1315.303 
It is to be observed that in carrying out its duties under its 
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the 
United Nations.  The Agreement between the United Nations and 
Sierra Leone is thus an agreement between all members of the 
United Nations and Sierra Leone.  This fact makes the agreement 
an expression of the will of the international community.  The 
Special Court established in such circumstances is truly 
international.304 
In addition, the agency theory better embodies the logic of the 
Charter’s collective security system.  The Charter famously discarded 
international law’s traditional view of armed conflict as solely the 
concern of the warring parties, insisting that all member states share 
                                               
28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7052 (Oct. 29, 2013) (statement of Egypt) (noting that the 
Council’s methods are the collective responsibility of the all Members because Article 
24 indicates the Council acts on behalf of the entire membership); U.N. SCOR, 6300th 
mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6300 (Apr. 22, 2010) (statement of Lebanon) (promoting 
an increase in open door meetings to promote transparency as Article 24 the Council 
represents all members); U.N. SCOR, 3611st mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3611 (Dec. 
20, 1995) (statement of Algeria) (declaring that the Council’s acts must have 
additional legitimacy because the Council acts for all Member States). 
 301. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 20 (May 31, 2004). 
 302. Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 37 
(Feb. 2002). 
 303. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2001-01-I, ¶ 35.  The resolution authorized the 
Secretary-General to “negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone 
to create an independent special court consistent with this resolution.”  S.C. Res. 1315, 
¶ 1 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
 304. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2001-01-I, ¶ 38 (citation omitted).  The Court cited 
Article 24, paragraph one, of the Charter as support for the proposition in the first 
sentence of this passage.  Id. ¶ 38 n.31. 
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an interest in maintaining the peace.305  The agency theory ensures 
that the official positions of member states on conflicts do not diverge 
from executive decisions of the Council on the same conflicts by 
making the two legally indistinguishable. 
Under the agency theory, Council resolutions would not only 
acquire the universality critical to General Assembly resolutions’ 
customary status, but would effectively become state practice—the 
most traditional source of custom.  Assuming the agency theory is 
correct, is it sufficient to demonstrate member states’ consent to 
Council actions relevant to custom?  There are at least two reasons one 
might answer in the negative.  First, Article 24(1) is a legal fiction, as 
the Council’s small size and political composition make it in reality 
quite unrepresentative of the broader membership.  Second, the veto 
ensures that interests of the P5 can take precedence over the interests 
of other member states on whose behalf the Council purportedly acts. 
Neither of these responses is persuasive.  First, the claim that 
aggregated Council norms uniquely rely on a fictitious consent is simply 
incorrect.  The traditional view of customary international law is rife 
with legal fictions.  For instance, states that remain silent during the 
gestation of a customary norm are usually deemed to have consented 
to its emergence.306  And each act forming relevant state practice is 
deemed to have been undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation 
before that obligation crystalized into a binding norm.307  Indeed, one 
might well view the entire enterprise of discerning an actual consensus 
among states to be grounded in fiction.308  A fiction of member state 
consent to aggregated Council norms is thus hardly unique. 
                                               
 305. See NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & NIGEL D. WHITE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY:  THEORY, 
LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (2013) (contending that security is the public good enjoyed by 
all members of the organization). 
 306. SHAW, supra note 198, at 63–65; Charney, supra note 296, at 538 (arguing that 
it may be advantageous to engage with the legal fiction that countries who fail to object 
to the making of customary law have consented since customary law is traditionally 
created by a few states). 
 307. See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544 (2005) (questioning whether customary international law 
“can . . . ever come into existence if it requires opinio juris—a sense of legal 
obligation—before it can exist”). 
 308. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 474 (2000) (“[M]ost nations of the world lack the information, awareness, 
resources or inclination to fully participate in a customary law process based on 
presumed acceptance or consent.  Since these theories rely on the acts of a few, they 
define away the normative conviction of states, the element essential to establish the 
authority of custom, thereby reducing it to a fiction.”). 
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An additional reason to be skeptical of the unrepresentativeness 
claim as support for the view that aggregated Council norms uniquely 
create a legal fiction is that states directly involved in conflicts often 
give actual consent to identified norms, and it is therefore incorrect to 
describe consent to Council norms as wholly constructed or fictitious.  
Many of the norms originate in peace agreements negotiated with 
states undergoing or just concluding NIACs.  These agreements often 
contain detailed plans for post-conflict reconstruction initiatives to be 
overseen by a peacekeeping mission approved by the Council.309  Many 
tasks respond to aspects of the NIAC addressed when the conflict was 
active.  If the Council condemned the use of child soldiers, for 
example, peace agreements might contain provisions for their 
decommissioning and rehabilitation.310  The agreements also 
frequently request that the United Nations create a peacekeeping 
mission to oversee their implementation.311  Those oversight tasks are 
then incorporated into the mandate of the peacekeeping mission, 
which is approved by the Council.312  The multiple opportunities for 
these “specially affected” state and non-state actors to reject norms 
                                               
 309. See Michael Tiernay, Which Comes First?  Unpacking the Relationship Between Peace 
Agreements and Peacekeeping Missions, 32 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 135, 137 (2015) 
(explaining that parties sign peace agreements because a peace-keeping mission has 
been, or will be, deployed in that state); see also Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 116, at 
975 (detailing how Council Resolution 1325 suggested incorporating women in peace 
agreements and peace-keeping missions). 
 310. See Darfur Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-
Justice and Equality Movement, art. 29, ¶ 430, May 5, 2006, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_050505_DarfurPeace
Agreement.pdf (containing a provision for the disarmament and demobilization of 
child soldiers); S.C. Res. 1935, ¶ 19 (July 30, 2010) (encouraging all parties to work 
with the Secretary General to develop a plan to end recruitment of child soldiers); see 
also SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, CROSS-CUTTING REPORT:  CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT 4 
(2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/cross_cutting_report_2_children_and_armed_conflict_ 
2015.pdf (discussing Council Resolution 2143, which speaks generally to the 
protection of children, preventing underage recruitment of child soldiers, and 
supporting the “Children, Not Soldiers” campaign). 
 311. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, § 8.6.5, Jan. 9, 2005 
(requesting the support of the U.N.’s Peace Support Mission in implementing de-
mining efforts). 
 312. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 4(c) (Mar. 24, 2005) (granting the U.N.’s Mission in 
Sudan the authority to assist with de-mining efforts as requested in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement). 
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embedded in resolutions moves their approval well beyond the realm 
of fictional consent.313 
The second claim that veto power ensures the interests of the P5 over 
those of the other members epitomizes the charge that the Council is 
a politically elite body primarily responsive to the interests of the P5.  
But this overstates the veto’s role.  In the period covered by our data, 
thirty-three vetoes were cast with twenty-one of those addressing only 
two conflicts:  Israel-Palestine and Syria.314  During the same period, 
the Council passed 1485 resolutions.315  Vetoes thus account for only 
0.021% of resolutions put to a vote.  More importantly, there is little 
evidence that the reasons for the vetoes had any relation to normative 
obligations otherwise routinely imposed by the Council. 
4. Delegating authority to act but not to contribute to customary law 
Even if one accepts a theory of Council agency, it is not clear that 
the delegation to act on member states’ behalf includes the ability to 
contribute to the development of custom.  There is an argument that 
the former does not necessarily include the latter.  Article 24 itself is 
obviously silent on this question.  The most straightforward answer is 
that such a delegation to the Council would simply retain the link 
between acts and normatively relevant evidence that exists for state 
practice.  Evidence of practice is understood to inhere in state actions 
made legally consequential by opinio juris; the two cannot be 
disaggregated.316  For member states to authorize the Council to act on 
their behalf but withhold normative consequences of that action would 
consign the “acts concerned” to a legal black hole:  U.N. member states 
would not be acting in their own capacities, and thus no “state practice” 
would be created, but, with normative consequences withheld, the 
Council’s corporate acts would make no contribution to customary 
                                               
 313. This is obviously not the only context in which the Council creates obligations 
in NIACs, but it is a common one. 
 314. See UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13.  For a list of all vetoed Security 
Council resolutions, see Security Council-Veto List, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto (last updated Jan. 8, 2018).  The 
states and conflicts addressed by vetoed resolutions were Nicaragua (1), Israel-
Palestine (15), Cyprus (2), Bosnia (3), Guatemala (1), Macedonia (1), Myanmar (1), 
Zimbabwe (1), Georgia (1), Syria (6), and Ukraine (2). 
 315. The first resolution of 1990 was number 647; the last resolution of 2013 was 
number 2132. 
 316. In the ICJ’s phrasing, for purposes of custom, “the acts concerned” must “amount 
to a settled practice.”  North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (emphasis added). 
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law.  As a result, no actor could claim as its own the potentially significant 
contributions to custom represented by the data set.317 
5. Conclusions 
The Charter places the Council at the center of its collective security 
scheme, endowing it with powers not available to member states acting 
unilaterally.  To accept the Council’s exceptional authority in NIACs 
but withhold any normative consequences of that authority would 
make little sense, since then no international actor would take 
ownership of this important body of practice. 
C. Frequency and Consistency of Council Practice 
The Council’s role as preeminent legal regulator of armed conflict 
is the first component of the argument for treating its practice in 
NIACs as evidence of custom.  The second component is the practice 
itself, some of which was examined in review of the four contested 
issues of customary law the Council has addressed.318  The data also 
lend themselves to the broader question of whether the Council has 
largely fulfilled or abdicated its leadership role set out in the Charter 
system.319  If the Council either failed to respond to the most destructive 
NIACs or addressed the legal issues those conflicts raise in an ad hoc or 
unsystematic manner, one might conclude that Council practice has 
little to add to customary law.  The data suggest this is not the case.320  
This Section shows that the Council has been omnipresent in 
contemporary NIACs and consistently imposed similar obligations 
across those NIACs. 
The claim for Council relevance to custom does not depend on 
Council imposing these same obligations in every NIAC going forward.  
That is, this Article does not argue the Council will consistently 
displace otherwise applicable norms by legislative fiat.  The Council’s 
relevance emanates rather from a demonstrated commitment to the 
same norms of conduct in the NIACs in which it has intervened.  That 
the Council has not imposed obligations in every NIAC is also not a 
critique of this Article’s claim.  As long as the reasons for its non-
                                               
 317. The argument here is complex.  If Council acts do count as evidence of custom 
they would, under the agency theory, ultimately be attributed to the Council’s 
principals:  the member states.  But absent an agency theory, the normative value of 
Council acts would be attributed neither to member states acting in their own 
capacities nor imputed to member states via their agent. 
 318. See supra notes 53–181 and accompanying text. 
 319. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 320. Id. 
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engagement in a particular conflict are unrelated to the norms 
imposed in the vast majority of NIACs in which it does engage, the 
Council’s absence from a few conflicts does not make its normative 
patterns less relevant as evidence of law. 
Similarly, consistently imposed obligations are not marginalized just 
because the Council does not impose the same obligations in each and 
every NIAC it addresses Different NIACs present different challenges 
to the Council.  To take an example discussed above, parties in some 
NIACs mostly adhere to peace agreements while parties in others 
violate them regularly.321  Although the Council does not oblige parties 
to adhere to such agreements in NIACs in which they are already being 
obeyed, this is not an example of inconsistent practice.  It is simply 
responding to the circumstances of each conflict as needed. 
1. Frequent Council involvement in contemporary NIACs 
The Council dramatically increased its response to NIACs after the 
end of the Cold War, both quantitatively—by passing resolutions on 
more conflicts—and qualitatively—by engaging in a substantially 
broader range of activities, particularly post-conflict.322  The data show 
that the Council passed at least one resolution on 76% (35/46) of all 
NIACs from 1990 to 2013 that fit the inclusion criteria.323  The figure 
is slightly higher—80% (12/15)—for NIACs that began after 1990, 
with only the conflicts in the Republic of the Congo, Algeria, and 
Nigeria receiving no resolutions.324  While it is difficult to identify with 
certainty the causes for Council abstention from the Republic of the 
                                               
 321. See supra notes 129–43 and accompanying text. 
 322. See infra Table 3; see also DOYLE & SAMBANIS, supra note 151, at 6 (describing the 
increase in Council activity between 1987 and 1994); Einsiedel et al., supra note 67, at 
5–8 (acknowledging the increase of Council actions after the end of the Cold War due, 
in part, to the cooperation of the permanent Council members); ROBERTS & ZAUM, 
supra note 2, at 52–58 (noting the increase in the number of peacekeeping missions, 
the increase of post-conflict international administrations, the shift towards a broad 
definition of the Council’s authority under the Charter, and the creation of 
international tribunals). 
 323. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 324. Id. 
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Congo,325 Algeria,326 and Nigeria327 conflicts, inaction does not appear 
to have stemmed from a reluctance to pronounce on normative issues 
                                               
 325. The Republic of the Congo involved a multiplicity of reasons for inaction:  
conditions on the ground unfavorable to external intervention, deference to regional 
mediation efforts, and rapid changes in the conflict dynamic.  See Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program, Congo:  Government, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://ucdp.uu.se/#/ 
conflict/408 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  In August 1997, the Council began 
peacekeeping preparations after the Organization of African Unity appealed to the 
Council to send a peacekeeping mission, echoing an earlier request from the President 
of the Congo.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Situation in the Republic of the Congo, 
¶¶ 17–18, U.N. Doc. S/1997/814 (Oct. 21, 1997).  However, in mid-October of that 
year, the fragile government of President Pascal Lissouba fell to the forces of Denis 
Sassou-Nguessou, assisted by troops from Chad and Angola.  Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, supra.  In late October 1997, the Secretary-General reported that the Council 
had set three conditions for dispatching a force:  “(a) adherence to an agreed 
ceasefire; (b) agreement to international control of the Brazzaville airport; and (c) a 
commitment by the parties to a negotiated settlement covering all political and 
military aspects of the crisis.”  U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Situation in the 
Republic of the Congo, supra, ¶ 3.  He reported further that “[t]he Council took the view 
that, despite some positive political developments, those conditions had not yet been 
fulfilled and called upon the parties to fulfil them without delay.”  Id.  Reporting to the 
Council on October 21, 1997, the Secretary-General acknowledged that this (at least short-
term) victory meant plans for a U.N. mission could not go forward.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 326. The reasons for abstention from Algeria appear to be a combination of some 
Council members supporting the government in its conflict with Islamist rebels and 
the government’s strong resistance to any external involvement for the first six years 
of the conflict.  The Algerian conflict began after the military cancelled the second 
round of elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front in December 1991.  Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, Algeria:  Government, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, 
http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/386 (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  Both France, the former 
colonial power, and the United States supported the regime in its subsequent civil war.  
ANDREW J. PIERRE & WILLIAM J. QUANDT, THE ALGERIAN CRISIS:  POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 
WEST 52 (1996).  But resistance from the Algerian parties to any reconciliation efforts 
played no small role in the lack of external involvement.  Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, 
Algeria (1992–Present), in 1 CIVIL WARS OF THE WORLD:  MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD 
WAR II 103, 117 (Karl Derouen, Jr. & Uk Heo eds., 2007); Gorm Rye Olson, Europe and 
the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa:  How Serious Is Europe and for What 
Reason?, 97 AFRICAN AFF. 343, 363 (1998). 
 327. One could argue that the Nigeria/Boko Haram conflict was effectively 
addressed by a Council resolution.  In May 2014, the Council’s Al Qaeda sanctions 
committee took the significant step of adding Boko Harm to its sanctions list, citing 
reasons that echo its broader normative agenda for NIACs.  See Narrative Summaries of 
Reasons for Listing, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (May 22, 2014), https://www.un.org/sc/ 
suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jama%27atu-ahlis-
sunna-lidda%27awati-wal-jihad-%28boko (citing numerous acts of terror including 
attacks on Nigerian schools and students as the reasons for listing Boko Haram).  
Because the sanctions committee is composed of Council members, the committee’s 
condemnation of Boko Haram is effectively a condemnation by the Council.  See 
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the Council addresses regularly in other conflicts.  Indeed, in two of 
the three conflicts—in the Republic of the Congo and Nigeria—the 
Council issued Presidential statements that echoed normative 
positions taken in other NIACs.328 
In addition to addressing more conflicts since 1990, the Council also 
began regularly invoking Chapter VII and deploying peacekeeping 
missions.  The Council issued Chapter VII resolutions in 48%, (22/46) 
of all NIACs from 1990 to 2014, and where the Council passed at least 
one resolution for a NIAC, it invoked Chapter VII in 63% of those cases 
(22/35).329  Of the seventy missions authorized by the Council since 
1948, fifty-three (76%) were authorized after 1990, and fifty-eight 
(83%) were authorized after 1988.330  This represents an increase in 
propensity to use the most important legal authority and the most 
interventionist tool available to the Council, from an average of 0.35 
missions authorized per year prior to 1990 to an average of 2.21 after 
1990.331 
  
                                               
Security Council Subsidiary Bodies:  An Overview, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 328. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Terrorist Attacks by Boko Haram, U.N. Press Release SC/12233-AFR/3319 (Feb. 2, 
2016) (condemning the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Dalori village in Nigeria 
on January 30, 2016); S.C. Pres. Statement 2015/4 (Jan. 19, 2015) (denouncing the 
actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon); U.N. SCOR, 7421st mtg. at 
2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7421 (Mar. 30, 2015) (addressing the Boko Haram attacks in 
Nigeria and appealing for international support of the humanitarian crises caused by 
the attacks); S.C. Pres. Statement 1997/47 (Oct. 16, 1997) (calling for a halt to the 
violence and respect for the civilian population in Republic of the Congo); S.C. Pres. 
Statement 1997/43 (Aug. 13, 1997) (advocating for a halt to the violence in the 
Republic of the Congo and for adherence to a previously negotiated ceasefire 
agreement). 
 329. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
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The implications of the Council having addressed virtually all 
contemporary NIACs are two-fold.  First, this negates the claim that the 
Council’s normative preferences are specific to particular conflicts, 
regions, or even time periods of the post-Cold War era.  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, this reaffirms the Council’s central role in 
the international community’s response to NIACs.  The Council’s 
omnipresence stands in contrast to a much lower level of state 
involvement in the same NIACs.  The Council has generally not 
intervened in NIACs alongside individual states or regional 
organizations but has done so in lieu of intervention on their part.332  
Few states either have the capacity to intervene effectively in NIACs or 
view intervention as furthering their national interests.333  Non-Council 
interventions from 1990 to 2013 were generally limited to a small 
                                               
 332. See supra note 3 (finding that individual states or groups of states only 
intervened in 31% of the same conflicts in which the Council took action). 
 333. See Sumon Dantiki, Organizing for Peace:  Collective Action Problems and 
Humanitarian Intervention, J. MILITARY. & STRATEGIC STUD., Winter 2004, at 1, 3–6 
(proposing that the lack of technological capabilities and the failure to view 






87%% of Conflicts that are NIACs 
% of NIACs with at Least One Council Resolution 
% of NIACs Assigned a Peacekeeping  
Mission 
% of NIACs with Chapter VII
% of Chapter VII NIACs with Sanctions Imposed
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group of states.334  Few states intervened in any conflict, and fewer 
intervened in multiple conflicts.  The states that did intervene were 
largely (1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states 
intervening in just a handful of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
former Yugoslavia); (2) former colonial powers; or (3) regional powers 
intervening in neighboring conflicts.335  Indeed, the data show that 
every non-U.S. intervention was carried out by a neighbor or a former 
colonial power.336  By contrast, the Council is unique in both its 
consistency of action and breadth of activity.  Whereas the Council 
addressed 76% of all conflicts coded, third-party interventions in 
conflicts account for just 31% of our cases.337  Taking account of 
Council practice thus creates parity with member states’ apparent 
delegation to the Council of their individual capacities to intervene in 
NIACs regularly or systematically. 
2. Consistent imposition of similar obligations 
The second element is the Council’s consistent imposition of similar 
obligations across the NIACs with which it has engaged.  A sampling of 
issues338 gives a sense of the Council’s consistent use of the same 
normative tools across conflicts.  In NIACs in which the Council 
invoked Chapter VII, it imposed the following obligations in the 
frequency indicated:  human rights violations condemned (64% of 
conflicts), cessation of hostilities required (88%), adherence to peace 
agreements required (83%), compliance with IHL obligations 
mandated (82%), cessation of violations of international criminal law 
required (50%), freedom of movement mandatorily granted to U.N. 
personnel by non-state actors (82%), and sanctions imposed (73%).339  
In addition, the Council authorized peacekeeping missions with 
                                               
 334. See supra note 1 (explaining that the data cited on this proposition is taken 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program).  See generally, Erik Melander et al., Organized 
Violence, 1989–2015, 53 J. PEACE RES. 727, 727–28 (2016) (analyzing state-based armed 
conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided conflicts from 1989 to 2015). 
 335. The non-NATO interventions during the period included Ethiopia’s 
intervention in Somalia, multiple neighbors and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, 
France and Rwanda in DR Congo, Russia and Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, and similar 
interventions by neighbors in Azerbaijan, Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan.  ECOWAS 
intervened in West African conflicts, and other temporary coalitions led by France 
intervened in Africa. 
 336. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See supra Section III.B (discussing the use of Council-imposed obligations in 
different NIACs). 
 339. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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mandates to create or enhance democratic institutions (63%), protect 
human rights (82%), enhance the rule of law (65%), protect U.N. 
personnel and installations (82%), and support transformation of 
national institutions (71%).340 
D. Elements of Customary Law in Council Practice 
Customary law consists of practice and opinio juris—the “belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it.”341  This Section will argue that the Council practice 
evidenced by the data set reflects these two traditional elements. 
1. Practice 
One of the most common criticisms of viewing international 
organization resolutions as evidence of custom is that they are 
statements divorced from action:  though often articulating specific 
legal obligations, they lack the accompanying act or omission that 
opinio juris designates as legally relevant.  But binding Council 
resolutions are not mere verbiage; they are themselves actions that 
create new legal obligations and on occasion impose punitive measures 
for non-compliance.342  In this sense they are similar to domestic 
legislation, a frequently-invoked source of state practice.343  But many 
resolutions in the data set go farther than imposing obligations to 
authorize action by peacekeepers or national forces.  In total, the 
Council established fifty-three peacekeeping missions during the data 
set period.344  The missions’ mandates initiated a series of acts on the 
ground by U.N. personnel.345  The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General appointed for each mission reports regularly to the 
Council on progress and challenges, creating a feedback loop by which 
the Council adapts its mandate to new circumstances on the ground.346 
                                               
 340. Id. 
 341. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20). 
 342. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 (noting that states consider the Council’s 
resolutions regarding terrorism as binding resolutions strengthened by the possibility 
of enforcement for non-compliance). 
 343. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 77 (including state 
“legislative and administrative acts” as forms of practice relevant to custom”). 
 344. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 345. See Connie Peck, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, in THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 67, at 457, 470 (illustrating 
how an individual peacekeeping mission brings additional influences, including 
supervision by the peacekeeping troops and other U.N. monitors). 
 346. Id. at 458–59. 
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These two types of resolutions—those only imposing obligations and 
those authorizing action to enforce the obligations—should not be 
considered distinct for purposes of identifying relevant Council 
practice.  Rather, they should be interpreted as a continuum 
constituting all relevant practice.  When the Council seeks to bring 
about an objective it typically begins with a non-binding exhortation, 
then moves to a binding decision, and then, if necessary, to compelling 
compliance.347  If a binding decision alone is sufficient to achieve 
compliance, then the Council has no need to authorize action.348  Its 
failure to act in such circumstances evidences no less commitment to 
the legal obligations previously imposed than if the target of the 
obligations had resisted, making compliance measures necessary.349  
National legislation is not disqualified as evidence of state practice 
because it is obeyed in most or all cases, necessitating no enforcement 
action by state authorities.350  The same view should apply to Security 
Council resolutions:  success in producing compliance should not 
militate against resolutions counting as evidence of custom. 
Finally, two factors prominent in the ILC’s assessment of state 
practice are also relevant to the Council.  The first is the context in 
which evidence arises.351  The Council has been involved in virtually 
every contemporary NIAC and it regularly addresses the most 
contentious legal issues arising from those conflicts.352  There is no 
international body with greater involvement in NIACs and certainly 
                                               
 347. E.g., S.C. Res. 2266, ¶ 2 (Feb. 24, 2016) (deciding to renew the imposition of 
sanctions on Yemen until it complied with U.N. Resolutions and returned to peaceful, 
political transition); S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 1 (Apr. 14, 2015) (demanding a return to 
democratic political transition and an immediate cease to the use of force by Houthis); 
S.C. Res. 2201, ¶¶ 1–2 (Feb. 15, 2015) (deploring the Houthi dissolution of 
government and takeover of Yemeni government institutions and reiterating the need 
for resolution of differences through dialogue). 
 348. See D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Govt Wants to Review Ban on Tamil Diaspora Organizations Listed 
as “Terrorists,” DAILY MIRROR (June 26, 2015), http://www.dailymirror.lk/77795/govt-
wants-to-review-ban-on-tamil-diaspora-organizations-listed-as-terrorists (describing Sri 
Lanka’s willing compliance with binding Council Resolution 1373 by designating 
sixteen organizations as terrorist fronts and freezing the organizations’ assets and 
economic resources). 
 349. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1–2 (Sept. 28, 2001) (deciding that States shall prevent 
the financing of terrorists and terroristic acts by cutting off financial assets and denying 
safe haven for any individual involved in terrorism). 
 350. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 91 (including a state’s 
legislative acts as a form of recognized state practice). 
 351. Id. at 84. 
 352. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (describing the extent of the 
Council’s involvement in NIACs). 
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none with the authority and propensity to bind parties to legal 
obligations.353  Council resolutions should be accorded particular 
significance based on this unique role.  Second, the ILC has instructed 
that practice of international actors is to be assessed “as a whole.”354  
For the Council, this means taking account not just of individual 
resolutions or conflicts but of the Council’s approach to a legal issue 
across the entire range of conflicts with which it engages.  This is 
precisely the contribution of the aggregated data.355 
2. Opinio juris 
The nature of evidence needed to demonstrate opinio juris is 
contested:  the ILC insists opinio juris cannot be inferred from the mere 
existence of practice, while commentators note an ICJ trend of 
inferring opinio juris from a general practice.356  If one takes the latter 
view then the data would itself be sufficient, since the obligations 
identified are repeated in resolutions across a wide spectrum of time, 
geography, and intensity of conflict.357  If one accepts the ILC view that 
separate evidence is required, the evidence may be found in three 
places.  First, the Council itself recognizes that its resolutions may 
affect custom.  The many resolutions disclaiming any precedential 
value in authorizing pursuit of pirates in Somali territorial waters are 
the prime example.358  Second, the coded resolutions often make 
specific reference to the legal context of the obligations, referring to 
                                               
 353. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (noting that the Council intervenes 
in NIACs at more than twice the rate of individual states or groups of states and does 
so in a far broader range of conflicts). 
 354. ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 92. 
 355. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 356. Compare ILC Draft Conclusions on Custom, supra note 5, at 84 (requiring the 
elements of a general practice and opinio juris to be addressed individually with 
separate evidence), with CRAWFORD, supra note 236, at 26 (noting that the ICJ often 
infers the element of opinio juris from evidence of a general practice).  See generally 
Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 148 (1987) (observing 
that scholars have long believed that the existence of an opinio juris can be inferred 
from a state’s consistent practice when there is little or no support against the existence 
of an opinio juris). 
 357. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 358. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012) (“Affirms that the authorizations 
renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall 
not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under 
international law, including any rights or obligations, under the Convention, with 
respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall 
not be considered as establishing customary international law . . . .”); see also supra 
note 23 and accompanying text. 
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applicable IHL, human rights law, or the possibility of criminal 
accountability.359  The Tadić  court found such references significant in 
the resolutions it cited in support of a customary norm.360  In these 
resolutions, in other words, the Council was not simply employing 
pragmatic conflict-resolution tools devoid of international legal value 
but was specifically invoking international law in order to bolster the 
legitimacy of the obligations it imposed.361  Third, regardless of 
whether the resolutions fit a pre-existing paradigm of opinio juris, they 
have already been cited as constitutive of custom by six different 
international courts.362  In those opinions, the resolutions were 
“accepted as law.”363 
More broadly, characterizing these obligations as conflict-specific 
takes an unduly narrow view of how the Council approaches NIACs.  
The Council does not start anew for each conflict, but rather 
consistently uses the same obligations across a diverse array of 
NIACs.364  These obligations do not each represent ad hoc political 
compromises, as suggested by reference to the Council as an essentially 
“political” body.  For example, the Council imposed binding or 
potentially binding obligations on non-state actors to respect human 
rights in seventy-six separate resolutions in the data set, obligated those 
actors to adhere to peace agreements in 202 resolutions, and required 
free and fair elections in post-conflict states in thirty resolutions.365  
The data set demonstrates that the Council hardly considered these 
standards as one-off initiatives applicable only to single conflicts. 
Finally, there is an air of formalistic unreality in applying a strict view 
of opinio juris to Council resolutions.  Social science literature has long 
demonstrated that international institutions such as the Council play a 
critical role in the definition and diffusion of norms.366  Norms 
                                               
 359. See S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 8–9 (Mar. 26, 1993); S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 10 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
 360. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 361. See supra note 359. 
 362. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 363. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1(b) (requiring the ICJ 
to apply international custom as evidence of an opinio juris); see also 1 HUGH THIRLWAY, 
THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:  FIFTY YEARS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 182 (2013). 
 364. UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:  
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 237 (1985) (demonstrating that having 
international regimes against which to measure actions is beneficial as these regimes 
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frequently migrate well beyond their initial application, and 
international organizations facilitate the process.367  Institutions 
provide venues for socialization368 and states use international 
institutions to communicate information about norms, goals, and 
intentions.369  They employ institutions to self-bind in order to lock in 
commitments.370  Institution-based efforts to signal participation in 
norms can lead to lasting changes in behavior.371 
These pathways to norm diffusion are hardly lost on Council 
members.  Professor Alexander Thompson, who focuses on the politics 
on international organizations, argues that powerful states channel 
coercive strategies through international organizations like the 
Council.372  His argument demonstrates that the intent of members 
                                               
“provide information about actors’ compliance; they facilitate the development and 
maintenance of reputations; they can be incorporated into actors’ rules of thumb for 
responding to others’ actions; and they may even apportion responsibility for 
decentralized enforcement of rules”).  Security Council action can also be seen as a 
form of contested multilateralism—the process by which states, unsatisfied with the 
ability to create norms through normal channels, can use alternative means to create 
new regimes.  See Julia C. Morse & Robert O. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9 REV. 
INT’L ORGS. 385, 387–88 (2014).  Finally, Snidal, Koremenos, and others show in a 
series of arguments that states are deliberate and precise when designing international 
agreements, institutions, and organizations precisely because of the power 
international organizations hold.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States 
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 25–26 (1998); 
Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 
761, 767 (2001). 
 367. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895, 899–900 (1998) (showing how norms are 
internalized through a “life cycle,” diffusing through a system of actors and increasing 
their applicability during the process). 
 368. See Brian Greenhill, The Company You Keep:  International Socialization and the 
Diffusion of Human Rights Norms, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 127, 129–30 (2010) (suggesting that 
international organizations influence states by providing a forum for states to interact 
and emulate norms). 
 369. See Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through IOs:  The Security Council and the 
Logic of Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (2006) (proposing that states 
channel their policies and norms to other states through international organizations). 
 370. See Beth Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International 
Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 229 (2010) (describing how states utilize institutions, 
such as the International Criminal Court, to “pre-commit” themselves to norms). 
 371. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:  INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 7–8 (2009) (examining how treaties are open, public 
commitments made by states that signal a state’s obligation to perform certain 
behaviors or changes in behaviors). 
 372. See Thompson, supra note 369, at 14 (examining the actions of the United 
States during the Gulf War as a case study to demonstrate how coercive states use 
international organizations to influence other states). 
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using the Council is to shape the expectations of target states.373  To 
hold that Council-imposed obligations are insufficiently infused with 
an intention to affect normative change is to ignore the central role 
the Council already plays in norm creation and diffusion.  Even when 
informal groups of states address issues outside the structure of the 
Council, they frequently couple their efforts with Council resolutions 
for legitimacy,374 and the Council’s legitimacy helps states overcome 
collective action problems and rally public support for interventionist 
activity.375  In short, international institutions generally—and the 
Council specifically—have been shown to assist in the diffusion of 
norms among states. 
VI. TWO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
There are at least two potential challenges to our claim that the 
Council, acting on behalf of the entire U.N. membership, contributes 
evidence of custom.  First, Council resolutions do not impose 
prospectively binding obligations applicable to all states.  Second, the 
Council is structurally unsuited to assuming a law-making role.  This 
Section will examine both objections. 
A. Resolutions are not prospectively binding, as required  
by customary international law 
The first is that patterns of past Council action are not the same as 
obligations that bind parties prospectively.  This challenge asserts that 
while patterns of obligations may demonstrate the Council’s normative 
preferences across more than two decades just passed, they cannot—or 
should not—serve as evidence of its preferences for norms in future 
conflicts.  At a minimum, it could be argued, one would need to assume or 
demonstrate that the Council will continue to impose the same obligations 
going forward with the same regularity to overcome the criticism. 
This claim has two variants.  The first is that while the Council may 
continue to pass resolutions on most NIACs, it may alter or abandon 
its prior normative patterns.  The evidence for this is scant.  The 
                                               
 373. Id. at 7–9. 
 374. See Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 59 INT’L 
ORG. 559, 575–76 (2005) (describing the activities of the Western Contact Group on 
Namibia, which initially operated without a Council mandate but later cooperated with 
the Council to legitimize their initiative). 
 375. See Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Supplying Protection:  The United Nations and Public 
Support for Humanitarian Intervention, CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 1, 11 (2017) 
(finding that, in the context of United States intervention in Syria, Council approval 
mitigates some of the problems of collective action and increases public support). 
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conflicts in which the Council has imposed obligations differ in time, 
location, parties, issues, size, duration, and geo-political context.376  
Equally important, the relatively uniform body of obligations was 
imposed by a Council whose membership varied regularly over time.377  
Given that most conflicts examined continued for multiples years and 
even decades, any given conflict was likely addressed by almost seven 
different configurations of Council membership.378  That Council-
imposed obligations have remained constant while almost every other 
aspect of conflicts fluctuates makes it highly unlikely that the Council 
would suddenly alter its normative response to NIACS in the future.379  
Finally, most of the patterns we identify do not radically alter existing 
international law but resolve normative uncertainty or continue 
existing trends.  This makes sharp Council departures from well-
trodden paths less likely. 
The second and alternative basis for the claim that patterns of 
obligation lack a prospective element is that the Council may address 
                                               
 376. The Council has addressed conflicts in every year, every region, of varying 
duration, of varying number of actors, of varying battle deaths and civilian casualties, 
at various points in conflict, and both within and outside the sphere of influence of 
every hegemonic state.  From 1990 to 2013, the conflicts the Council addressed include 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa (32%), the Americas (7.5%), the Middle East and North 
Africa (28%), Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(13%), Southeast Asia (7.5%), and South Asia (11%).  UN Security Council Data Set, 
supra note 13.  Of the conflicts that meet the criteria for inclusion in our data, fifteen 
began after 1990 (of which the Council addressed twelve, or 80%, through 
resolutions), and thirty-one began before 1990 (of which the Council addressed 
twenty-three, or 74%).  Id.  The majority of conflicts lasted more than a decade, though 
some ended in less than a year.  Id.  Some involved two main actors, such as Yugoslavia 
versus the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo, while others involved numerous 
groups with complex alliances and byzantine conflict dynamics.  Id. 
 377. See Current Members, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/ 
sc/members (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (stating that the Council is comprised of fifteen 
member states:  five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that are 
elected for two-year terms). 
 378. The average duration of a NIAC is difficult to calculate, in that a large portion 
of observations in our data involve ongoing conflicts, and many others are conflicts 
that began prior to the start of the data set.  Using an open start date and including 
only NIACs that have ended, the average duration of a NIAC is approximately twenty 
years.  Given that the Council’s non-permanent members have two-year terms 
staggered in one-year increments, the entire non-permanent membership turns over 
every three years.  Thus, the average conflict will have been reviewed by six to seven 
different Councils, meaning the Council tends to behave consistently, even as the 
composition of the body changes substantially. 
 379. This is not to say the Council would not change its practices to account for 
methods that performed well or poorly in the past.  Peacekeeping practices, for 
example, have evolved substantially since the early 1990s. 
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fewer NIACs or become highly selective in those with which it does 
engage.  Many point to the Council’s absence from the Syrian and 
Ukrainian conflicts as evidence that such a retreat is already 
underway.380  But neither case has involved abstention based on new 
normative preferences for conflict.  Council deadlock is instead related 
to political disagreements among Council members over the merits of 
the conflicts.381  Certainly, there is no evidence that shifting normative 
preferences were responsible for the Council’s non-engagement in 
Algeria, Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria, the three post-1990 
NIACs in our data set on which it passed no resolutions.382 
More broadly, some critics may argue that while the Council might 
have intended to shape norms in the past, the increasingly jingoistic 
tone of international relations signals a retreat from multilateralism.  
We do not see this as a debilitating critique.  The international system 
has both shifts and means.  Shifts do occur, during which norms or 
systems substantially change.  Shifts created the modern system of 
international law and repeatedly spread its applications.  But means 
are also important—and ultimately, the concern is whether the mean 
behavior of the Council over the long term creates the reasonable 
expectation of the application of international laws to civil conflicts.  
This Article claims there is a mean behavior that engenders a mean 
expectation, and though aberrations may occur from time to time, they 
in themselves only highlight the degree to which expectations have 
already converged on acceptable behavior. 
B. The Council is Structurally Unsuited to Law-Making 
The second potential challenge asserts that the Council is 
structurally ill-suited to produce evidence of international law.  This 
claim takes a variety of forms:  the U.N. Charter does not endow the 
Council with law-making powers; the Council is unrepresentative of 
the community of states on whose behalf it purports to act; the veto 
privileges the P5’s interests above all else; and the Council lacks 
attributes of due process and transparency that are essential to any 
                                               
 380. For an assessment of these critiques that does not accept many of their 
premises, see Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., The UN Security Council in an Age of Great 
Power Rivalry 3 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper Series No. 4, Feb. 2015), 
https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1569/WP04_UNSCAgeofPower
Rivalry.pdf (arguing that the inaction in Syria and the Ukraine stemmed from political 
deadlock between the five permanent members of the Council). 
 381. Id. (examining the political alliance between Russia and China in relation to 
their joint Council vetoes). 
 382. See supra notes 323–27; see also UN Security Council Data Set, supra note 13. 
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legitimate law-making process.  The representativeness and veto 
concerns were addressed above.383  Nonetheless, these questions 
remain.  There is certainly no doubt that compared to the full 
representation accorded member states or their citizens in bodies, 
such as the General Assembly or European Parliament, the clear 
codification mandate of the ILC, or the opportunity for full input by 
affected parties in judicial bodies, like the ICJ or regional courts, the 
Council falls short as a source of normatively relevant practice. 
One must question the salience of these all-too accurate 
observations after (i) twenty-three years of the Council imposing an 
increasingly broad range of obligations on state and non-state actors 
alike in NIACs,384 and (ii) the fourteen-year period in which the 
Council has been passing, albeit sporadically, explicitly law-making 
resolutions.385  More importantly, the legitimacy critiques beg the 
question of why attributes of other international bodies should serve as 
the measure of the Council’s legitimacy as a participant in law-making. 
The aggregation of Council actions over time allows for the 
introduction of a unique factor into the legitimacy calculus, namely 
the repetition of binding norms across a series of highly diverse 
conflicts.  This substantial variation in the origin of oft-repeated norms 
distinguishes this Article’s view of Council law-making from that 
critiqued in most analyses,386 which overwhelmingly focuses on either 
explicitly legislative resolutions387—Resolution 1373 (terrorist 
                                               
 383. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing member states’ concerns 
about the representativeness of the Council); supra notes 314–15 and accompanying 
text (addressing the use of Council vetoes). 
 384. See supra note 12 (examining Council resolutions on the most consequential 
NIACs between 1990 and 2013). 
 385. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 & n.7 (stating that the Council entered into a 
new phase of legislative resolutions with the passage of Resolution 1373 in 2001). 
 386. An exception is Vincent-Joël Proulx’s analysis of how a broad range of Security 
Council resolutions assigning responsibility for various acts contributes to the law of 
state responsibility.  See VINCENT-JOËL PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY:  GLOBAL SECURITY AND UN ORGANS 157–58 (2016). 
 387. Even with reference to the legislative resolutions, the legitimacy critiques do 
not fully match the resolutions’ provenance or actual reception by states.  Legislative 
resolutions are best described as gap-fillers adding to obligations already contained in 
widely ratified treaties and imposing those “treaty-plus” obligations on non-party states. 
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financing),388 Resolution 1540 (weapons of mass destruction),389 and 
Resolution 2178 (foreign fighters)390—or on single conflict-specific 
acts—including creating international criminal tribunals or 
demarcating borders.391 
The legitimacy critique, moreover, is far from uniform or internally 
coherent.  Some point to defects in Council process to argue that the 
Council has inappropriately expanded its jurisdiction under Article 39 
of the Charter to include virtually any issue of general international 
concern.392  Others cite the same defects to argue the Council has been 
                                               
 388. Resolution 1373 was based on the obligations in the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which has been ratified by 187 
states, though it expanded those obligations in several critical respects.  PIERRE KLEIN, 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 4 
(2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icsft/icsft_e.pdf.  Compare International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, arts. 4, 6–8, Dec. 9, 
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (directing states to pass legislation criminalizing terrorist acts 
and taking steps to find terrorists and freeze their assets), with S.C. Res. 1373, at 16, 
¶¶ 2–3 (Sept. 28, 2001) (expanding on the Convention by directing states to deny 
terrorists safe havens and accelerate the exchange of intelligence to quickly take action 
against suspected terrorists). 
 389. Resolution 1540 on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons was negotiated to 
minimize new disarmament obligations on states themselves and placed most emphasis on 
preventing non-state actors from acquiring the weapons.  S.C. Res. 1540, at 2, ¶¶ 1–2 
(Apr. 28, 2004); see BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 17, at 113–14 (arguing that Resolution 
1540 enhances existing treaty law by expressly excluding any rights or obligations that 
would conflict with current treaties).  While some states expressed dissatisfaction with 
the breadth of the resolution, negotiations resulted in clarifying its lack of impact on 
existing state obligations and a “subsidiary” mechanism that left the details of national 
legislation on interdicting weapons up to individual states.  See Ian Johnstone, The 
Security Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 80, 92–93 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008). 
 390. S.C. Res. 2178, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2004).  Resolution 2178 was cosponsored by 104 
states.  See U.N. SCOR, 7272nd mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7272 (Sept. 24, 2014).  It 
repeated many obligations the Council had been imposing on states since the 9/11 
attacks.  See Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014):  The “Foreign Terrorist 
Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part I, EJIL TALK (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-
fighter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-i. 
 391. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 16, at 874 (examining Resolution 1373 Counter-
Terrorism and Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committees); Bjorn Elberling, The Ultra Vires 
Character of Legislative Action by the Security Council, 2 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 337, 338–39 
(2005) (describing three legislative-type resolutions); Lourdes de la Serna Galván, 
supra note 16, at 153–54 (noting the two ad hoc tribunals and demarcation of 
Iraq/Kuwait boundary). 
 392. See generally Joy Gordon, The Sword of Damocles:  Revisiting the Question of Whether 
the United Nations Security Council Is Bound by International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605, 
608–11, 609 n.12 (2012) (referencing sources that critique the Council’s broad authority). 
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too timid and selective in the issues and conflicts it addresses.393  
Further, the critiques focus only on how the Council’s membership 
and procedures delegitimize its actions, omitting discussion of the 
positive impact the Council often provides.394  As scholars Roberts and 
Zaum observe, “states have invested significant diplomatic capital in 
garnering Council authorisation for their actions.”395  When states use 
force unilaterally, the first response of many international actors is that 
Council approval was absent.396  Monika Hakimi and Jacob Cogan, who 
describe a “state code” of norms on the use of force that stands in many 
ways in contrast to the formal “institutional code” of the U.N. Charter 
and its cognates, find that even the state code accepts the Council’s 
primacy on the use of force questions and has done so since the 
Council’s reinvigoration after the first Gulf War in 1991.397 
The Council was not intended to be a law-making body.  Critics of 
the Council as law-maker thus invoke aspects of its structure, 
membership, and procedures that lack the inclusiveness and due 
process guarantees of other law-making processes.  But with most 
collective efforts at resolving and mitigating the effects of NIACs now 
largely centered in the Council, these critiques must be weighed 
against the substantial investment that many states—not simply the 
P5—have made in Council authority. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of evidence that the Council has imposed consistent patterns 
of obligation on parties to virtually every contemporary NIAC, this 
Article has sought to open a dialogue about the relevance of Council 
practice to customary international law.  The data demonstrate the 
Council has taken a side, and arguably contributed to resolving legal 
debates, on three important issues:  (i) human rights obligations of 
non-state actors; (ii) the binding nature of NIAC peace agreements; 
and (iii) the necessity of holding elections in post-conflict states.  The 
data found further that the Council has at least raised the question of 
whether a nascent jus ad bellum for NIACs is emerging, based on 
                                               
 393. See ROBERTS & ZAUM, supra note 2, at 68–69 (describing inaction as one of the 
Council’s weaknesses). 
 394. See id. at 71. 
 395. Id. at 72. 
 396. See Thompson, supra note 369, at 17–18 (describing the reactions of world 
leaders to the United States’ invasion of Iraq at the start of the Gulf War). 
 397. Monika Hakimi & Jacob Katz Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 257, 261, 268 (2016). 
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resolutions that demand an end to hostilities but also delineate several 
permissible exceptions. 
This Article argues that in imposing these obligations the Council 
has acted as an agent for other U.N. member states.  In attributing 
Council-imposed obligations to the entire U.N. membership, we 
extend the Council’s preeminent role in the collective security regime 
to the realm of generating practice constitutive of customary 
international law.  Failure to account for the Council’s centrality in 
resolving NIACs—substantially exceeding national interventions in 
scope and frequency—would consign this critical international 
practice to a legal black hole. 
The data set comprises the most complete known account of Council 
obligations related to NIACs.  The data set opens opportunities for 
further research in multiple directions.  First, future research can help 
understand voting and political dynamics on the Council, such as the 
predictors of Council and state support for provisions in resolutions.  
Second, combining the data with conflict and civilian casualty data can 
help to elucidate the dynamic interactions between the Council and 
active conflicts and demonstrate which events or dynamics lead the 
Council to use specific provisions.  Third, the data allow for analysis of 
Council efficacy:  how Council provisions affect conflicts and post-
conflict environments.  Students of the Council, human rights, 
international humanitarian law, and conflict studies may leverage the 
data to tease out the complex linkages between Council politics, 
Council decisions, conflicts, and peace. 
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APPENDIX I 
Security Council Terminology Coding Key 
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